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Over the past two decades an increasing number of theo-
rists and practitioners have called for a thorough rethink-
ing of the underlying assumptions of the concept of rrental 
illness and the traditional psychiatric nodes of responding 
to mental disorders. The work of this group of writers has 
come to be referred to as the "antipsychiatry" literature. 
The insights of this perspective center largely about a re-
jection of those theories and methods of treatment that are 
based upon the medical model. Many writers point to the use 
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of traditional psychiatric practice as an oppressive instru-
ment of social control. While much of this perspective is 
directed toward the analysis of specifically sociological 
factors there have been few attempts by sociologists to pro-
vide focus for the claims that have been made. 
This paper proposes a synthetic sociological framework 
with the intention of providing sociological focus for the 
otherwise disparate insights found within this literature. 
A general model is constructed by incorporating aspects of 
the labeling perspective, the sociology of knowledge, and 
Marxian analysis. The model provides the analytical tools 
for investigation of the manner in which "mental illness" 
as a concept, and the phenemenon which it allegedly de-
scribes, are rooted in the nature of everyday life. 
The framework that is developed places particular em-
phasis upon the political dimensions . of everyday life. This 
dimension is especially useful in explicating the role of 
labeling as a device to discredit the claims of . people as 
they attempt to identify the oppressive aspects of . their 
social environment. The nature .of socialization within 
Western culture is analyzed in terms of the various factors 
which are instrumental in the mystification of consciousness 
and its relationship to "mental illness." 
The observation is made that the majority of the claims 
that are proffered by the "antipsychiatrists" are devoid of 
a firm empirical foundation in that they rely primarily upon 
) 
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findings from case studies and a series of loose inferences. 
An attempt is made to overcome this problem by mapping out 
the empirical points of departure for the model by develop-
ing a set of testable propositions and corollaries. 
It is concluded that a radical sociology .of knowledge 
framework does provide a useful method of conceptualizing 
the 11 antipsychiatry 11 literature from a sociological perspec-
tive. The validity of the claims themselves, however, must 
wait until much more of the empirical evidence is in. It is 
pointed out that extreme caution be taken to avoid conten-
tions to the effect that all mental disorders can be fruit-
fully analyzed by this framework or that capitalism per se 
causes mental disorder. 
Suggestions are made as to the likelihood that some 
diagnostic categories, more than others, may be subject to 
analysis by this model. It is implied that further research 
into the role of biopsychological factors will undoubtedly 
show the interactive effects of such factors with defective 
socialization and oppressive social relationships. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
over the past two decades there has been a growing 
recognition of the need to rethink modern analysis of the 
phenomenon we commonly call mental illness. Although the 
number of theorists and practitioners that have written in 
this mode has grown steadily and their works have identified 
collectively as the "antipsychiatry movement" there is 
little evidence of serious attempts to systematize this ap-
proach sociologically. In fact there have only been a few 
attempts to bring exemplary writings together in book form. 
~!though all of the writers make reference to the role of 
social structural, institutional, and other specifically 
sociological factors in shaping perspectives on the topic 
they move little beyond debunking the predominant use of the 
medical model in response to insanity. What this paper will 
attempt to do is to off er a sociological framework that in-
corporates the otherwise somewhat disparate insights found 
in the "antipsychiatry" literature. Our thes~s for this ef-
fort will be to the effect that the "antipsychiatry" litera~ 
ture can be reconceptualized within a radical sociology of 
knowledge framework yielding a more coherent and fruitful 
analysis of the phenomenon of insanity. 
There have been few sociological attempts to conceptu-
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alize the issues of insanity that have been raised in the 
"antipsychiatry" literature. This paper attempts to pro-
vide a sociological focus for these issues through a radical 
formulation of the sociology of knowledge. Being such an 
exploratory endeavor the paper will surely raise more ques-
tions than it will answer; nevertheless it is hoped that it 
will result in at least the skeleton of a sociological ac-
counting of insanity that is superior to both the medical 
model and the insightful but theoretically incoherent 
"antipsychiatry" literature. One has to feel a bit uneasy 
about trekking through largely uncharted theoretical ter-
ritory; regardless of what is offered here, a "final" state-
ment at this exploratory stage will always be ipso facto an 
incomplete statement that will invariably be subject to a 
myriad of logical attacks and greatly in need of futher 
clarification. The reader is advised to view this paper as 
an attempt to formulate the beginnings of a different soc-
iological approach to insanity. To force this paper into a 
logically refined and complete form denies its very purpose 
and nature as an exploratory, hypothetical, and tentative 
investigation. 
TERMINOLOGY AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The works of Thomas Szasz, appearing first in the 
" mid-fifties, chronicle the emergence of a perspective on 
madness not in keeping with the traditional use of the med-
3 
ical model. Szasz has written most extensively on the sub7 
ject, and his book The Myth of Mental Illness (1974) is a 
good synopsis of his approach although it is exemplified 
here with reference almost exclusively to hysteria. The 
next group of works in this general tradition is from R.D. 
Laing appearing first in 1960 (the Divided Self). The 
works of these two psychiatrists along with the sociologist 
Erving Goffman (Asylums, 1961) were virtually the only major 
examples of a nascent "antimedical-model" stance on insanity· 
until quite recently. Recent efforts to collect the emerg-
ing writings and research formulated in this vein include 
three books, The Radical Therapist (1971) edited by Jerome 
Angel, Radical Psychology (1973) edited by Phil Brown,* and · 
Labeling Madness (1975a) edited by Thomas Scheff, and the 
emergence of two journals; Rough Times (formerly The Radical 
Therapist) and the Journal of Radical Therapy. While 
Scheff's book attempts to cast this general approach within 
the labeling perspective, the other recent sources do little 
more than imply the possibility of interpreting the "anti- . 
psychiatry" literature from a general Marxian or radical 
perspective. These two general approaches to systematizing 
the insights from the "antipsychiatry movement" are ridden 
with both incoherence and contradiction. 
*Brown's text is apparently the first to identify this 
approach to insanity under the rubric of "an tipsychia try. " 
See chapter two. 
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Incoherence is exhibited by both strategies. First, 
the labeling perspective itself has suffered extensive crit-
icism for its own lack of theoretical clarity and coherence;* 
Scheff offers no major improvements in this book. Further-
more he fails to include any of the works of Laing, Szasz, 
or Goffman, thus falling far short of dealing with the full 
range of concerns that are characteristic of the "anti-
psychiatry" literature. As Walter Gove (1975a:61) has ob-
served, the labeling theorists of mental illness do not 
forward a general explanation of the phenomenon itself. Al-
though Scheff (1975:90-92) does suggest the notion that men-
tal disorder is related to the repression of emotion he 
comes far short of offering a general explanatory framework. 
The radicals are als.o guilty of a lack of 
1 
coherence in their 
I 
approach insofar as they make reference to a Marxist psy-
chology as if it were something already well formulated in 
the writings of Marx, which is simply not the case, as is 
pointed out by Adam Schaff (1970:40-2), Peter Berger (1969: 
ix), Richard Lichtman (1975:58), and Richard Ropers (1973: 
42) • 
The contradictory characteristics of the. radical ap-
proach can be found in the efforts to overcome the problem 
just mentioned by developing a Marxist psychology. The very 
* See the discussion in Don Gibbons and Joseph Jones 
(1975:124-134) which is a concise accounting of the major 
criticisms of the labeling perspective • 
.. 
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use of the wording a "Marxist psychology,'! represents a con-
tradiction in terms. Marx, in the few places that he grap-
ples with the issue of the human individual, deviates mark-
edly from a psychologistic perspective as it is implied in 
the terms "a Marxist psychology." For example, he had noth-
ing but sharp criticism of Feuerbach for postulating "an 
abstract - isolated - human individual" (emphasis in the 
original). In contradistinction Marx contended that "the · 
essence of man is not an abstraction inherent in each par-
ticular individual. The real nature ·of man is the totality 
of social relations" (1964:68). Thus, while it might make 
sense to talk of . a Marxist social psychology (or socio-
psychology) , to speak of a Marxist psychology goes against 
the grain of a truly Marxist perspective. 
The central emphasis of the radical "antipsychiatrists" 
is to focus attention on social relationships in modern cap-
italism as the true locus of what have traditionally been 
viewed as personal psychic disorders. Yet they persist in 
their efforts to develop a psychology which tends toward 
movement of the causal nexus in the direction of the in-
dividual. This is undoubtedly an inadvertent consequence 
of the training and background of the radicals which is al-
most exclusively psychiatry and psychology. It remains a 
contradiction, however, and reflects a serious problem in 
their work. The need to overcome this deficiency is point-
ed out by Angel (197l:xvi) in arguing that the therapist, 
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"expert as he may be at · analyzing interpersonal . forces, he 
is of ten ignorant about forces controlling the larger soci-
ety in which he lives. This must be exposed and clarified." 
Michael Glenn (197l:xi) identifies a serious consequence of 
an individualistic approach in therapy in that "emphasis on 
the individual cools people out ••• by turning their focus 
from society • • • to their own 'hang-ups. ' " Yet neither 
writer moves beyond radical psychology as a framework f:rom 
which to answer the problems they . find in traditional psy-
chology. 
This contradiction has been an historical feature of 
Marxism since its rebirth in the 19SO's and 'GO's in the 
universities. Since that time the writings of Erich Fromm, 
Reuben Osborne, Wilhelm Reich, and Herbert Marcuse have 
largely served as the modern Marxist psychology. Keith 
Brooks (1973:322-328) contends that the movement toward a 
Freudian perspective was more a reaction to cold sterile 
behaviorism than a logical and coherent effort to develop a 
Marxian microview of social relations. Although Brooks also 
fails to see much beyond a Marxist psychology himself he 
does offer the most complete refutation of the type of psy-
chology found in Freudianism. * The ·following passage cap-
tures his view of Freud's psychology: 
*On this point, see also Richard Ropers (1973:43) and 
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967:194). 
I 
Freudianism, as a microview that considers the 
"truth" of human beings to reside outside of their 
social relations, does not even understand individ-
uals • • • the onlycontrTbution Freud made was in 
providing the basic concepts to be used in the mys-
tification and obfuscation ~ people's everyda.I_ · 
lives. Fre'Udianism is paft of the problem • 
. (Brooks I 1973: 322) (emphasis rn the original) 
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What Brooks calls for is a theoretical framework that 
offers "a definition of the individual as a social being, as 
a being-in-the-world" (1973:333). What follows ·. in this paper 
can be viewed largely as an attempt to wrestle with this 
question. 
What we hope to discover here is a theoretical strategy 
that will incorporate both the labeling perspective and a 
radical perspective on the issue of insanity. The belief is 
that this can be accomplished through a radical interpreta-
tion of the sociology of knowledge. In the next chapter we 
will deal explicitly with that radical sociology of knowledge 
framework. In Chapter III a brief analysis utilizing a rad-
ical sociology of knowledge will be employed in regards to 
psychiatry and the concept of "mental illness." Chapter IV 
will focus attention on the politics of everday life and 
offers a radical .interpretation of the processes involved. 
In Chapter V a series of testable propositions deriving from 
a radical sociology of knowledge framework is presented. 
Chapter VI will try to draw some conclusions on the basis of 
our sociological excursus into insanity. 
A BRIEF NOTE ON MARXIAN ANALYSIS AND INSANITY 
I'S' 
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As we have implied already, Marxian analysis of socio-
psychological phenomena is poorly developed and this paper 
is suggestive of a possible strategy to overcome this de-
ficiency. In . this endeavor several issues ·emerge which 
would threaten the clarity of the analysis that follows. 
Thus, for purposes of clarification we need to offer a very 
brief discussion of some of the factors involved in a Marx-
ist analysis of insanity. Our analysis will almost exclu-
sively limit attention to insani!ty as it occurs in Western 
culture under the reign of capitalism. If the argument pre-
sented here were to postulate a simplistic unilinear causal 
argument that capitalism-causes-insanity, the facts would 
immediately invalidate our contentions. Obviously this is 
·not the case and yet for some reason critics of Marxian 
analysis tend to force it into these kinds of formulations 
(undoubtedly some Marxian arguments are sufficiently rhetor-
ical to warrant this criticism); Marxist analysis should not 
be construed so as to minimize the problems within those 
.forms of political economy which both precede and follow 
capitalism. A truly Marxist perspective simply focuses upon 
the dialectical relationship between the base, substructure, 
and superstructure in any society. Our analysis does not 
mean to imply that insanity did not exist before capitalism 
or that it will disappear with its demise. Instead, we sim-
ply contend that the forms of oppression will always differ 
qualitatively within different political economies. How 
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much they differ quantitatively is an empirical question. 
It would seem to follow, however, that smaller differentials 
in power would yield a smaller potential for oppression. We 
still await these future societal forms of more equitable 
distributions of power and privilege. When they manifest 
themselves then, and only then, can we subject this question 
to empirical test. At present, however, we can point to the 
way in which control of the means of material production in 
capitalist society also effects control of the means of in-
tellectual production. We can look to the factors upon 
which power is based in this society and the way in which 
that power is used to maintain itself politically from "mac-
rolevel" to "microlevel" contexts. 
The causal influence of oppression .or coercion that is 
related to insanity in the following pages should not be in-
terpreted as an explanation for all cases of insanity. We 
are merely suggesting the way in which some mental disorders 
might be a function of various oppressive social relation-
ships or how that some mental deficiencies may be intensified 
· by them. Conclusions as to the accuracy of this contention 
must be based . upon research that follows from this line of · 
causal reasoning. The general parameters of such investiga- 1 
I 
tions are outlined in Chapter V. 
CHAPTER II 
A RADICAL SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 
We can begin our effort to ford this theoretical river 
by stepping in at the point marked off by the sociology of 
knowledge framework as it has been generally expounded by 
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckrnann (The Social Construction 
of Reality, 1967). What is envisioned here will not be an 
extraction or formulation of a separate theory on the ques-
tion of deviance in that we will be directing attention away 
from the deviant(s). This strategy is not new as the label-
ing people advocate a similar procedure; yet in turn they 
wish to inspect the situational context and those persons 
and institutions that attach the label of deviance. What 
we shall see here is an attempt to )focus attention away from 
deviants one step further toward an inspection of everyday 
life and the nature of social reality. In this way we can 
discuss deviance in the same context that we would use to 
deal with conformity. Within this approach, conformity is 
equivalent to sanity; that is, accepting the status quo as 
real and singular. Challenging the status quo, or insanity, 
evokes social control which itself, through labeling, serves 
to maintain or reify the contemporary conceptions of reality · 
as natural facts which ipso facto exclude any alternative 
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conceptions of reality not contained within the commonly 
shared symbols, signs, and meanings manifested in everyday 
language. Social control, at least in part, results in the 
attachment of a label to a challenger which discredits him 
or her and the alternative perception of reality that is 
presented. An investigation of these issues will necess~-
· tate discussion of processes of internalization within a 
.;• 
general symbolic interactionist frame of reference which it-
self is intricately linked with the sociology of knowledge 
(at least in Berger and Luckmann's notion of such). The 
reader should be sensitive, however, that the central focus 
of this paper is an endeavor to extend a radical social per-
spective to microlevel social phenomena, uncovering the 
sociopsychological violence and oppression that character-
izes much of everyday life and consciousness as it is man-
ifested in the issues of insanity. 
A question may arise at this point as to the advis-
ability of incorporating bourgeois theory in a radical for-
mulation of theory. One perspective in Marxist thought sug-
gests that any bourgeois theory is inherently laden with 
class bias that invalidates any of its insights. A growing 
number of radicals have advocated ] 1.us.t such a procedure, 
however, in response to some of the deficiencies in the 
Marxist perspective.* As is pointed out by Richard Lichtman 
* . For example see R.W.J. Dingwall • (1975), Donald Hansen 
(1976), Richard Ropers (1973), and Mark Wardell (1975). 
(1975:58) radicals can benefit by studying the works of 
some bourgeois theorists. 
But Marx left important issues unsolved; and time 
has added new ones. It is not enough for us to re-
peat Marx's formula. The dialectic of subjectivity-
objectivity has not been fully grasped as yet, and 
we have much .to learn about the issue ••• from 
bourgeois writers like Mead (with his emphasis on 
the social origin of the self), [and] social in-
teractionists like Seely, Blumer, Berger and 
Luckrnann (sensitive to the intentionality and ob-
j~ctification of social rules) • • 
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Corning f rorn the other direction, we will take Berger 
and Luckmann seriously in their advocacy of a humanistic 
stance in sociology that would require "a systematic account-
ing of the dialectical relation between the structural real-
ities and the human enterprise of constructing reality - in 
history" (1967:186). At the outset, at any rate, we are 
probably on safe ground to infuse radical insights into their 
work without distorting its fundamental intelligibility. 
Another question that we need to explore is the manner 
in which we can discuss labeling perspective. Perhaps the 
easiest way to deal with this matter is to examine the role 
of labels in the maintenance of cultural themes. For our 
purposes we can view such themes as part of the superstruc-
ture which, according to Charles Bolton (p.17), can be seen 
as equivalent to what Berger and Luckrnann call the symbolic 
universe. These cultural themes permeate the other "phe-
nornenologically objectified products of the social process." 
The ' most significant of these products is language in that 
it provides for sharing and transmission of cultural themes 
13 
or meaning and reality between groups, individuals, institu-
tions, and generations. The particular aspect of language 
that is central to the immediate question is the role that 
it plays in social control. Thus, language provides for the 
transmission of cultural themes and also protects those 
themes in providing labels that discredit social actors that 
challenge their legitimacy. For example, Trent Schroyer 
(1975) contends that the dominant cultural theme in America 
is the ·"technocratic strategy in which politics and science 
are related integrally as the means for a more efficient and 
effective decision-making process" (p.19). According to 
Schroyer this grants a scientistic legitimation to the "man-
is-pawn-of-natural-necessity theme" that coerces us into a 
perception of the present form of our social world as in-
evitable when it really is a contrived device which serves· 
as "a justification of the perpetuation of private power 
and privilege" (p.25). The reality of the barbarism that is 
engendered within such a society is unmasked by dissenters 
only to be denied by labeling such dissent as treason. This 
label discredits the challengers and the observations that · 
they make. The dynamics of the process include the credit-
inq labels or titles of these doing the labeling as is re-
vealed in some observations made by Brooks (1973:349) about 
the label of paranoia. 
Paranoia, like other Freudian concepts, has the 
primary effect of discrediting a person's life . 
situation as the ground for behavior. The po-
litical puq>os.e of this is • • • obvious • • • 
such as when Bruno Bettleheim labeled people who 
were protesting the firing of Marlene Dixon from 
the University of Chicago as paranoids, or when 
Thomas Foran, who was the chief procecutor of the 
Chicago Eight said that all talk about political 
repress.ion in this country was paranoia ( ! ) • 
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Given a political context the dynamics of discrediting 
labeling are fairly straightforward. The issues :become 
somewhat more muddied when this process is analyzed within 
the context of the politics of everyday life (i.e. the pol-
itics of the family, shcool and workplace). A detailed 
analysis of the political features of everyday life in these 
contexts will be dealt with later; for now the focus will 
be directed to the general manner in which these are a re-
f lection of the class struggle that characterizes the "macro-
political" sphere. 
It can be argued, as Schroyer (1975:17) does, that 
domination in modern society "is broader than economic ex-
ploitation and alienation." For instance, one could easily 
agree that it would be ludicrous to postulate the direct 
operation of the class struggle in the politics of the fam-
ily, but, to overlook its indirect effects would result in a 
serious shortcoming. One's perception of his or her family 
and its everyday operations is largely the result of the 
socialization one receives from schools, churches, and the 
media.* Class control of these sources of consciousness 
*of course the family itself, as well as peers, are 
significant sources of influence for this perception, but 
these sources of influence are typically instrumental in 
aiding the transmission of cultural values and norms that 
15 
production would effect a crucial albeit indirect effect of 
the class struggle as Lichtman (1975:54) so lucidly des-
cribes. 
Power over material production confers power over 
the production of consciousness. The ruling class 
exercises its power to distort consciousness through 
its control over the means of intellectual produc-
tion - schools, churches, the daily press, etc. I 
think it is clear that this model fits the pattern 
of the base-superstructure, and locates the source 
of mystification in the control over the super-
structure which the ruling class exercises as a 
consequence of its dominance over material wealth. 
This explanation follows from Marx's {]967a:438) own 
contention that "the class having the means of material pro-
duction has also control over the means of intellectual pro-
duction." Lichtman's conception reveals a "dialectical re-
lationship between base and superstructure, productive 
forces and relations of production, etc." (1975:56) an un-
derstanding of which is the only justifiable manner in which 
to break social reality down into these categories. For 
example, he states that the social relations of production 
cannot "be divorced from the remaining legal, moral, sexual, 
and religious institutions through which dominance and sub-
mission are internalized" (1975:57). In other words, the 
superstructure is both a consequence of the base as well as 
a source of its reinforcement and reification. It becomes, 
in the minds of people, a "natural" feature of the envi-
ronment. Labels, symbols, language, cultural themes, in-




stitutions, and so on interact dialectically in providing a 
Weltanschauung that reifies the base as both legitimate and 
singular. Inasmuch as language plays a crucial role in this 
interaction by virtue of being the essential mode of expres-
sion at all levels it would follow that themes of dominance 
and submission permeate the politics of everyday life as 
witnessed in the family, school, and workplace. We have 
already discussed the way in which labels are employed in 
traditional political contexts to discredit dissidents re-
acting to oppression and barbarism. The point here is that 
discrediting labeling also occurs in the context of the pol-
itics of everyday life to invalidate the claims of those 
who choose to identify its various oppressive dimensions. 
A radical sociology of knowledge framework informs us 
as to both the dialectical and phenomenological aspects of 
this process. Berger and Stanley Pullberg (1965) take a 
large step in this direction in offering a "critique of con-
sciousness" that incorporates two Marxian concepts: aliena-
tion and reification. In their analysis they separate the 
socially necessary processes - objectivation and objectif i-
cation - from those extensions or extremes of these pro-
cesses - alienation and reif ication. They argue that while 
social life requires objectivation (e.g. making tools or 
similar objects) and objectification (e.g. the "name" given 
to the tool which establishes distance between man and prod-
uct) the processes of alienation and reification are "de 
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facto characteristics of the human condition" (p.201). Ali-
enation is the .point in the phenomenological process at 
which the product becomes an alien facticity that is no 
longer recognizable as a product. Reification is the point 
in the process of alienation at which "the characteristic of 
thing-hood becomes the standard of objective reality" (p.200) 
(emphasis in original). These phenomenological processes 
.occur .within the framework of social structure which, accord-
ing to Berger and Pullberg, is the result of the historical 
nature of objectivation. Berger and Pullberg describe the 
relationship between man and social structure as "a dialec-
tical one. That is, social structure is produced by man and 
in turn produces him . • • man produces himself as a social 
being through social structure" (p.202). In The Social Con-
struction of Reality Berger and Luckmann expatiate upon the 
phenomenological aspects of these insights but fail to ex-
tend any of the dialectical insights found in Berger and 
Pullberg's article, although they (i.e. Berger and Pullberg) 
imply the wisdom of developing a "critique of everyday life 
that can proceed in a phenomenological and a Marxian 
manner ••. " (p.211). Although they · describe social struc-
ture as "a coercive instrumentality" (p.202) their insights 
are not radical in that they choose to deal explictly with 
only the phenomenological taken-for-grantedness of the world 
as an a priori feature of social control while merely imply-
* ing its role in violent or oppressive social control. 
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In Herbert Marcuse's (1964} analysis of modern society 
social control is described as being less blatant and ob-
servable and ever more mystified and coercive. The unwit-
ting response of societal members as they participate in 
the reality that is defined by the controls does not deny 
that they (the controls} really exist but rather "it only 
testifies to the efficacy of the controls" (p.8}. Marcuse's 
argument is that .the controls are so effective that they 
"appear to be the very embodiment of Reason for the benefit 
of all social groups and interests - to such an extent that 
all contradiction seems irrational and all counteraction 
impossible" and therefore protest or "intellectual and emo-
tional refusal 'to go along' appears neurotic and impotent" 
(p.9}. Society thus is submerged in a ."one-dimensional re-
ality" that is sufficiently enshrouded in mystification so 
as to deny the possibility of its own negation. What hap-
pens to those who envision the ability to transcend the 
reality of the status quo - those who perceive that reality 
has more dimensions than are peddled hypnotically by "the 
makers of politics and their purveyors of mass information" 
(p.14}? According to Marcuse such dissenters are sufficient-
ly diffused centrifugally by the reign of "objective" one-
* Violence as it is used here does not refer to physical 
violence per se but to what David Cooper (1973a:l28} discuss-
es as a "subtle, tortuous violence" that is often perpetrated 
by ostensibly "helpful" professionals. 
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dimensional reality that they can be handled by psychiatrists 
and thereby be "cured" (p.71). 
For now we can turn our attention to the analysis of 
labeling as a phenomenological process. A beginning point 
for this exercise is the discussion in Berger and Luckmann 
(1967:30-34) of typificatory schemes or the process of typi-
fication. They contend that social actors enter face-to-
face interactions with a set of typifications of the other 
person. These typifications are subject to modification as 
interaction progresses and one realizes that some or all 
typifications of the other are contradicted by incoming in- · 
formation. One may typify the other as grouchy or guff, for 
instance, only to find in an interactional episode of a mat-
ter of minutes that this person is not grouchy but in fact 
quite amiable. Berger and Luckmann discuss such interactive 
settings in such a way that we are left with the impression 
that both actors in a situation are equally empowered to al-
ter the other's typifications. Obviously there are few sit-
uations in which both parties are equivalent in terms of 
their power to modify the other's typifications. This over-
sight effects a serious misrepresentation of many or most 
interactional settings. There are at least two ways in which 
the most powerful of two actors can with some degree of per-
manence 'attach a label or typification to the other. The 
first is exceeding subtle and imperceptable. While the weak-
er actor may speak to the more powerful or prestigious actor 
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within an original mode of expression that assumes one typi-
. ficatory scheme the latter may listen and then speak within 
a different mode. The subtlety of the latter's power will 
generally cause the former to shift to the mode of expression 
utilized by the latter thus being forced into the accompany-
ing typifications. Thus, if a "patient" is complaining about 
the dynamics of family, work, or school, the psychiatrist 
may be listening and speaking in terms of mental disorder or 
neurosis. Inevitably the . "patient" will soon be tail.king in 
these terms as well, thus molding him- or herself into the 
psychiatrist's typifications. The second strategy is more 
blatant and coercive. The more powerful actor may partici-
pate in the interaction by simply asserting a typification 
or label which forces the weaker actor into a "damned if I 
do - damned if I don't" situation. That is to say that the 
weaker actor has two choices: (1) to respond by denying the 
typification, in which case his or her continually frustrated 
denials eventually reach an emotional level that is identi-
fied by the more powerful actor as symptomatic of the typi-
. fication; or, (2) to refuse to respond to the other's clai~s, 
in which case his or her silence is taken as an admission to 
the verity of the label. 
Berger and Luckmann contend that there is heavier re-
liance on typifications "as they are removed from ·the 'here 
and now' of the face-to-face situation" (1967:33). This 
implies that face-to-face interaction is seldom, in the later 
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stages, characterized by typifications or labels. Such a 
notion runs counter to the reality of many instances in so-
ciety in which highly institutionalized role behavior creates 
the contingencies for the predominant use of labels, cate-
gories, diagnoses, typifications, and so forth. A police 
officer arresting a juvenile, for example, may often rely 
upon a typificatory scheme that has been formulated in re-
lation to dealing with large numbers of juveniles over an 
extended period of time and passed on to new recruits by the 
older officers. In such cases the person is labeled as a 
particular type of person because the observed or suspected 
behavior is "characteristic" of that type. As Berger and 
Pullberg (1965:206) have observed, the behaviors in such 
situations "are perceived as standing separately from their 
performers." They contend that actors are often related to 
simply in terms of being embodiments of roles. In the in-
itial stages of an episode, however, there exists a consid-
erable degree of ambiguity or a variety of potential role 
ascriptions. Our police officer, for instance, may find a 
juvenile with a rock in his hand standing outside a school 
building where a window has been broken. While the question 
could be: "What explicit behavior has occurred?"; the ques-
. tion very often is: "What type of juvenile offender is this?" 
In other words the officer is likely to ascribe a role which 
would predispose the actor to a particular behavioral cate-
gory. The implications of this distinction are significant 
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inasmuch as the same situation could result in different 
role ascriptions yielding at least four definitions of the 
situation: (1) the window was already broken and the youth 
is about to break it out completely; (2) the youth accident-
ally broke the window while throwing at something else; (3) 
as a simple case of vandalism; or, (4) the youth was attempt-
ing to "break and enter." A variety of factors may affect 
the officer's eventual definition of the situation such as 
the type of language, clothing, and gesticulations that are 
exhibited by the youth. Kai Erikson (1967:11-12) describes 
this process as the operation of a screening device. 
The screening device which sifts these telling 
details out of the person's over-all performance, 
then, is a very important instrument of social 
control. We know very little about the properties 
of this screen, but we do know that it takes many 
factors into account which are not directly related 
to the deviant act itself: it is sensitive to the 
suspect's social class, his past record as an of~ 
fender, the amount of remorse he manages to convey, 
and many similiar concerns which take hold in the 
shifting moods of the community. This may not be 
so obvious when the screen is dealing with extreme 
forms of deviance like serious crimes, but in the 
day-by-day filtering processes which take place 
throughout the community this feature is easily ob-
servable. Some men who drink too much are called 
alcoholics and others are not, some men who act 
oddly are committed to hospitals and others are not, 
some men who have no visible means of support are 
hauled into court and others are not - and the dif-
ference between those who earn a deviant label and 
those who go their own way in pe.ace depends almost 
entirley on the way in which the community sifts 
out · and codes the many details of behavior to which 
it is witness. 
The eventual definition effects a role ascription that 
fits the officer's typificatory scheme which, at least in 
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part, has its roots in cultural themes as they are reflected 
* in the community. Thus, a working-class youth clad in lea-
ther jacket and jeans, employing "ghetto .lingo" stands a 
good chance of being cast into a criminalistic role yielding 
the most severe behavioral category as a definition of the 
situation. 
What occurs in such situations is a crystallization of 
roles and understandings that are resistant, in varying de-
grees, to modification. Once the typification, label, or 
role is ascribed, the original ambiguity of the situation is 
phenomenologically replaced by a concrete social construe-
tion or definition which is the basis for any further pro-
cesses that may be involved. According to Edwin Shur (1973: 
120-126) this original step is called stereotyping, which is 
followed by retrospective interpretation and negotiation. 
"Retrospective interpretation is the process by which once 
an individual is identified as deviant, he is seen in a to-
tally 'new light.' " The phenomenological nature of this 
process is described by Harold Garfinkel (1956:421-22). 
The work of the denunciation effects the recasting 
of the objective character of the perceived other: 
The other person becomes in the eyes of his condemn-
ers literally a different and new person. It is not 
that the new attributes are added to the old "nucle-
us." He is not changed, he is reconstituted ••• 
The new identity is the "basic reality." (emphasis 
*see also Don Gibbons' (1976:38-46) discussion of these 
influencing factors in a treatment of "offender-police char-
acterist~cs and police decisions" and "offender-police in-
teraction" as they relate to juvenile delinquency. 
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in the original) 
Thus, the labeled person's past is reinterpreted within the 
parameters of the label. In cases such as alleged delin-
quency or "mental illness" the categories or diagnoses are 
so vague and ambiguous as to engender retrospective inter-
pretation in sometimes very extreme or strained dimensions 
as we will soon observe. 
Negotiation refers to the bargaining between the la-
beled person and the labelers regarding the terms of their 
relationship. Power is an important factor in all cases of 
bargaining, and the lopsided relationship between the psychi-
atrist and the patient is no exception. The patient is at 
an obvious disadvantage; even if he or she should exhibit 
behavior that objectively challenges or contradicts the psy-
chiatrist's perception such an "experience will not contra-
dict it," according to Judith Willer (1971:19). 
We will find the concepts of stereotyping (i.e. typi-
fying or labeling), retrospective interpretation, and nego-
tiation informative as we turn our attention to psychiatry 
and "mental illness." 
CHAPTER III 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF MENTAL ILLNESS 
So a sick society invented psychiatry to defend itself 
against the investigations of certain visionaries whose 
faculties of divination disturbed it. * 
ANTONIN ARTAUD 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A MYTH 
Humans show an amazing propensity thoughout history to 
accept any plausible explanation for complex phenomena rath-
er than to admit that they don't have even a modicum of genu-
ine understanding. These explanations are often extremely 
simplistic; the product of religious mysticism, generations 
· Of interwoven superstitions, or collections of common sense 
"insights." The problem with such formulations is that, 
though often far from being true, they do constitute know-
ledge within specific historical parameters and as such serve 
as the basis for action that reinforces that knowledge. That 
is to say that such knowledge often circumscribes the very . 
actions that would eventuate in its demise or mod if ica ti on. 
Belief that .the world was . flat, for example, for a long peri-
od obviated those ocean voyages that eventually disproved it. 
*An observatrion made by Artaud (1965:135) who spent 
fifteen years of his life in an asylum. 
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Knowledge formulated in this way is highly resilient. An 
additional complicating factor of importance is that know-
ledge very often leads to institutional structures with 
various role positions characterized by power and privilege 
that have a vested interest in maintaining the contemporary 
perceptions and formulations of that knowledge. When change 
does occur it does so very slowly with its early proponents 
in danger of being riduculed, ostracized, or worse. The ex- . 
periences of Galileo in astronomy and John Huss in theology 
bear witness to an enduring problem in knowledge. 
Since New Testament times the Western world has pro-
duced a variety of plausible explanations for the phenomenon 
now generally referred to as mental illness. Although one 
can find definite improvements in this latest form of know-
ledge over previous ones, such as those previous beliefs 
which led to the "witch hunts" of Puritan New England, we 
will examine the ways in which "mental illness" as a social 
construction is devoid of the inherent skepticism that ena-
bles scientific perspectives to continually modify their 
·tentative formulations of knowledge. 
At some point in the history of insanity it was no 
longer tenable to conceptualize this phenomenon as individ-
uals possessed by demons or spirits. Szasz (1974:17-31) 
points to Jean-Martin Charcot (1825-1893) as the father of 
a new response to insanity as a "mental disease." As a 
neurologist and neuropathologist, Charcot postulated from 
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his post-mortem examinations of subjects afflicted with var-
ious organic disorders that all insane persons suffered from 
some other form of neurological defect and were thus also 
* 
"ill." Charcot thus set psychiatry on the tracks as a form 
of medical science. Charcot accomplished this by his simple 
insistence that malingering (i.e. feining symptoms like 
those of organically impaired patients) was really an illness 
he called hysteria. Freud inadvertently reveals the unscien-
tific manner in which this "discovery" was made - merely on 
the basis of Charcot's prestige. 
He explained that the theory of organic nervous 
diseases was for the present fairly complete, and 
he began to turn his attention almost exclusively 
to hysteria • • • [which) had at this time come very 
much into discredit . . • The general opinion was 
that anything may happen in hysteria: hysterics 
found no credit whatsoever. First of all Charcot's 
work restored dignity to the subject; gradually the 
sneering attitude, which the hysteric could reckon 
on meeting when she told her story, was given up; 
she was no longer a malingerer, since Charcot had 
thrown the whole weight of his authority on the side 
of the reality and objectivity of hysterical phe-
nomena. (Freud, 1948:18-19) (emphasis added) 
It is pointed out by Szasz (pp.28-29) that Charcot's demon-
stra.tions and explanations of hysteria were shown by Georges 
Guillain and others to be fakes. Seemingly Charcot could 
not admit that hysteria might have causes that were not in-
ternal, as his prestige in the matter derived from his role 
as a medical scientist; "this meant that he had to base his 
* Goffman (1973:26-27) .contends that the similarity be-
tween organic and functional psychoses largely accounts for 
the unreflective ·acceptance of the medical model in psychia-
. try. 
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case about hysteria on the premise that it was an organic 
neurological illness. Otherwise, if hysteria and hypnosis 
were problems in human relations and psychology, why should 
anyone have taken Charcot's opinions as authoritative?" 
(Szasz, 1974:26). One could muse that Charcot had still 
.Provided an ~dvancement for the insane by virtue of reifying 
their condition as illness which would accord them an "ex-
cused" social status for their behavior. In fact, however, 
the myth propagated by Charcot, Kraepelin, Breuer, Freud, 
·and many more performs a disservice for the insane as Szasz 
(1~74:24-25) succinctly explains: 
It might seem, at first glance, that to advocate, 
and indeed insist, that an unhappy or troubled per-
son is sick - and that he is sick in exactly the · 
same sense and way in which a person suffering from 
cancer is sick - is humane and well-intentioned, as 
it aims to bestow upon such a person the dignity of 
suffering from a genuine illness over which he has 
no control. However, there is a hidden weight at-
tached to this tactic which pulls the suffering 
person back into the same sort of disrepute from 
which this semantic and social reclassification was 
intended to rescue him. Indeed, labeling individ-
uals displaying or disabled by problems in living 
as "mentally .ill" has only impeded and retarded 
the recognition of the essentially moral and politi-
cal nature of the phenomena to which psychiatrists 
address themselves. 
It wasn't long after the insane asylum was introduced 
as a reform in this country, for example, before contentions 
regarding its oppressive potential for the insane, or those 
alleged to be insane, were vocalized. Acquiring the label 
of "mentally ill" and subsequent confinement to an asylum 
effects a dramatic curtailment of freedom and basic civil 
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rights and therefore constitutes at least the potential for 
flagrant oppression. According to s. Kirson Weinberg (1968), 
as early as 1849 legal suits were being brought against in-
dividuals responsible for commitments. 
While asylums were a decided improvement over previous 
·practices, such as chaining insane persons to dungeon walls 
(Europe) or auctioning them off like chattel for hard labor 
(America), they did not represent a rational response to the 
state of psychiatric theory and treatment practices. As is 
pointed out by Szasz (1974:18), David Rothman (197l:xv-xvi), 
and Goffman (1973:28-30), asylums were the societal response 
to a social problem which could best be handled by warehous-
ing the troublesome individuals in institutions where they 
would be "out of sight and out of mind." Often a person 
finds him- or herself committed to one of these institutions 
contrary to his or her own wishes. According to one set of 
statistics (Weinberg, 1971:183) over 45 percent of the ad-
missions to mental hospitals are other than voluntary. Some 
like Szasz (1974:260-261) are primarily concerned with those 
subjected involuntarily to treatment and commitment but 
Seymour Halleck (1971), another psychiatrist, rejects this 
strategy. In a manner more fully sensitized to the politi-
cal functions of the psychiatrist he depicts them as legiti-
mators of the system of knowledge inherent in the status quo. 
Halleck (1971:36) observes, that while critics like Szasz, 
Laing, and others ••• "have pointed out the repressive 
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uses of involuntary psychiatry; they have not acknowledged 
that even when psychiatric treatment is voluntary it has 
profound political consequences." Psychiatrists argue to 
the contrary, however, contending that their actions are 
purely medical and therefore politically neutral. This con-
tention is questionable in light of Halleck's insights into 
the nature of psychiatric intervention or treatment. 
In dealing with the individual, the psychiatrist 
usually emphasizes that person's internal problems. 
Psychiatric treatment that focuses upon internal 
conflict encourages the patient and those who in-
fluence him to believe that his social environment 
is not contributing to his misery and that the en-
vironment is therefore adequate. So long as treat-
ment does not encourage the patient to examine or to 
confront his environment and so long as treatment 
protects those who have adversely affected that pa-
tient from considering their own behavior, the net 
effect of treatment is to strengthen the status quo 
• . • It is apparent that whatever the psychiatrist 
does, he will either encourage the patient to ac-
cept the existing distributions of power in his 
world or encourage the patient to change them • • • 
There is a strange and unfortunate tendency among 
psychiatrists to believe that professional activi-
ties designed to change the status quo are politi-
cal and activities tending to strengthen the status 
quo are medical and neutral. This kind of think-
ing is illogical. By reinforcing the position of 
those who hold power, the psychiatrist is perform-
ing a political act whether he intends to or not. 
Once this fact is appreciated, the psychiatrist's 
search for political neutrality begins to appear 
illusory. (Halleck, 1971:35-36) 
The picture of psychiatry presented here by Halleck 
portrays it as a mechanism to correct the failures of the 
socializing agencies such as the family, school, church, and 
workplace. Most, however, are successfully socialized to 
passively accept the oppressiveness of their environment. 
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The observations on this point that have been made by Terry 
Kupers (1976) are instructive. In the social structures of 
capitalism Kuper's contends that Marx's (1967b:72) observa-
tion that human relations are subject to reification is still 
valid; that the " • social relation between men • • • as-
sumes in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between 
things." The history of capitalism is the constant acceler-
ation of social relationships to maximize efficiency and 
profits. The rationalization of productive forces has pro-
ceeded to the point where "the human qualities and idiosyn-
cracies of the work appear increasingly as mere sources of 
I 
error" (Georg Lucacs, 1971:91). In this world people "feel 
like things, more the object than the subject of their lives" 
(Kupers, p.111). According to Kupers, such a society . "is 
'schizophrenogenic.' But common as it is, outright schizo-
phrenia is not the plight of the entire population. Most 
people find a different way to live with reification" 
(p.117). This is accomplished in socialization. 
In the course of "normal" socialization, moments 
arise where the child is encouraged to ignore or 
be numb to certain events and experiences. As he 
or she learns which events and experiences are not 
to be noticed the child is shaped into convention-
al consciousness. (Kupers, 1976:118) 
Those that deviate from this mode of behavior are responded 
to by some of the social control agencies of society. These 
violations against conventional consciousness effect a class 
of deviations that fall outside of the more obvious forms of 
deviance. .Most categories of deviance are clearly delineated 
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- burglary, murder, embezzling, etc. ~ but some are not and 
fall under the type of deviance ref erred to as mental ill-
ness; a residual category, according to Scheff (1975b:7), 
which by its very. nature is vague and ambiguous. Ambiguity 
is an integral feature of "mental illness" as we will see 
in more detail in the next section of this chapter. 
The extensive experience that Halleck relates of work-
ing with university students and in private practice with 
typical middle-class patients unmasks the general "cooling 
out ... function of modern psychiatry. The dissident student 
experiencing extreme stress is encouraged to displace his 
attention to . some less volatile and stress producing activ- · 
ity; end of dissidence. The middle-class wife suffering 
from the oppressiveness of a domineering husband is encour-
aged to develop other interests that will defuse her com-
plaints of being unhappily married; "successful" termination 
of marital discord. In this manner psychiatry helps people 
to adjust to oppressive environments in the family, school, 
work, or politics. Those who don't adjust find themselves 
warehoused; the failures of both socialization and the re-
mediation of psychiatry. According to Halleck (1971:28) 
psychiatric patients are usually responding to the oppressive 
influence of some other person, group, or institution al-
though they may be partially or even totally unaware of the 
source of their troubles. Emphasis on internal factors will 
certainly exacerbate this problem of awareness as will treat-
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ment involving drugs, electro-convulsive shock therapy;. be-
havior modification, and psychosurgery. These "innovative 
technological advances" are the latest development in the 
socially constructed response to an enduring social problem. 
The general historical form has been one of increasing ef-
fectiveness in isolating and stigmatizing the deviants 
rather than modifying those social conditions responsible 
for their suffering, although recent developments in family 
therapy and milieu treatment are resulting in the emergence 
of some attempts to counteract this trend. 
THE FALSE SCIENTISM OF PSYCHIATRY 
Focusing attention on the contemporary condition of 
psychiatry will reveal additional problems in knowledge be-
yond those that have been raised in a sweeping discussion 
of its sociohistorical nature. The very fact that these 
factors are overlooked by the vast majority of contemporary 
psychiatrists would indict them of alienated consciousness 
as defined by Berger and Pullberg (1965:205): 
. . • alienated consciousness, both of world and 
self, may be designated as false consciousness .-
false in the sense that the actual process by which 
itself and its world have been produced is for-
gotten. If this false consciousness achieves a 
theoretical formulation, the latter functions as 
a mystification (or, if one prefers, as an ideology 
• . • • ) • (emphasis in the original) 
A mystification or ideology allows for a division of 
the social world into false categories such as "good" or 
''bad". The behaviors of people then can be viewed as a re-
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flection of the false category - in our case "mentally ill" 
(as opposed to "mentally healthy"). The various diagnostic 
subcategories of "mental illness" are extremely vague and 
unclear and as such can be used to .stigmatize a wide range 
of behavior. For example, the label of schizophrenia is 
identified by Scheff (1975b:8) as a catch-all for a variety 
of "offenses" against the implicit norms of a culture. The 
similarities between diagnostic psychiatric categories like 
schizophrenia and omnibus statutes as they relate to juve-
nile delinquency are significant. As Gibbons (1976:13) ob-
serves, omnibus statutes mark off categories of behavior 
"that are so vaguely defined that nearly all youngsters could 
be made the subject of court attention." 
The same shortcoming in the label of schizophrenia is 
unequivocally demonstrated in the research that is described 
by David Rosenhan (1975). He relates a research project in 
which eight researchers gained admission to twelve mental 
hospitals. In eleven of the twelve admissions the diagnosis 
of feigned hallucinations was schizophrenia. If we concep-
tualize this initial act as typification or stereotyping, as 
we discussed in Chapter II,* the dynamics of the labeling 
process will become clearer. The pseudopatients falsely re-
* In Chapter II we discussed Shur's (1973:120-126) no-
tions of the labeling process as stereotyping, retrospective 
interpretation, and negotiation as he uses them in the con-
text of juvenile delinquency. They are employed here to ex-
plain some of the dynamics of labeling insanity. 
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ported only their initial hallucinations, their names (to 
avoid having the label of schizophrenia attached permanent-
ly), and their occupations (to avoid special or preferential 
treatment by virtue of being viewed as unfortunate col-
leagues). When questioned about their background and family 
relationships then, they responded with true accounts from 
their lives. Invariably this information reflecting the 
background and interpersonal relationships of the "healthy" 
pseudopatients was twisted in unbelievable ways ·to 'fit ' their 
new and "real" identity. The label intiated a process of 
retrospective interpretation by which all previous events 
were viewed as leading up to the current schizophenic epi-
sode. The patient thus is often subjected to a "prepatient" 
label which is linked to the "new" label which in this way 
is not really viewed as new. In fact, the original diagnos-
tic session is characterized by Scheff (1975c:l7) as focus-
ing on what diagnostic category is to be employed rather 
than on whether the individual is in fact afflicted with a 
disorder. Once specific assignment to a category is effect-
ed the individual has acquired "a master status that excludes 
all other statuses fro~ consideration" (Scheff, 1975e:77). 
This includes status as a genuine human being. The research-
ers in Rosenhan's account reveal the dehumanized nature of 
their new status. Now as subhuman beings there was little 
interaction with even the nonprofessional staff. In fact, 
the only way to operationalize the amount of interaction with 
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patients was to measure the proportion of the attendants 
time spent outside the "cage" (i.e. the room, typically 
glassed-in, where records .are kept and from which medication 
is dispensed). Attendants remained in the cage 88.7 percent 
of the time they were on duty. Moving up the hierarchical 
staff structure in the mental hospital less and less time 
was spent with the patients. Attempts to initiate interac-
tion with the staff were either ignored altogether or, in 
some cases, resulted in beatings. The mental patient pos-
sesses little, if any, power to negotiate the nature of the 
relationship in which he or she is located. 
While in the mental hospital there was no instance 
where either professional or nonprofessional staff recognized 
the "mental health" of a pseudopatient. In the first three 
hospitalizations in which records were kept, however, 35 of 
the 118 patients on the admissions wards detected the sanity 
of the investigators. In all cases, the pseudopatients di-
agnosed as schizophrenic were released as "schizophenics in 
remission." The investigators were kept in the hospitals 
for stays ranging from 7-52 days (X=l9 days). 
How many people are unnecessarily admitted to mental 
hospitals? Admittedly this question is unanswerable but 
Rosenhan's research points to some measures offered by psy-
chiatric personnel themselves. The staff at a research and 
teaching hospital doubted, upon hearing the above results, 
that the same thing could occur at their institution. The 
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staff was told that in the following three months that pseu-
dopatients would try to gain admission to their hosptial. 
During this period they were asked to rate all admitted pa-
tients as to whether or not they were genuinely 11 ill. 11 Of 
193 patients admitted during the three month period 41 were 
judged by at least one staff member with high confidence as 
a pseudopatient. In fact, however, none of Rosenhan's in-
vestigators tried to gain admission to. the hospital during 
the specifed period. 
One doesn't need to expound upon the potential for 
oppression that is demonstrated by this research; it is only 
too frighteningly evident. Suffice it to mention that the 
depiction of mental hospitals offered by Ken Kersey in his 
novel, One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest (1962), .is apparently 
rooted more in fact than it is in fiction. 
The diagnostic activities of psychiatrists provide a 
false sense of scientific accuracy to what are really social-
ly constructed .categories that could be used to typify vir-
tually anyone's behavior. The mere suggestion that one is 
"mentally ill" provides the basis for an unreflective quest 
for an adequate diagnosis as has been dramatically demon-
strated by Maurice Temerlin (1975)• He relates the findings 
of research . in which a professional actor was employed to 
play the role of a normal, healthy, adult male. An interview 
was taped in which the actor posed as a mathematician who 
had read a book on psychotherapy and wanted to talk about it. 
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The interview was recorded and played later to 25 psychia-
trists, 25 practicing clinical psychologists, and 45 graduate 
students in clinical psychology. Just before hearing the 
interview a prestigious professional (a confederate of the 
experimenter) commented that the patient on the tape was "a 
very interesting man. because he looks· neurotic, but actually 
is quite psychotic." The subjects were asked to diagnose 
the man as either mentally healthy, neurotic (with specific 
diagnosis), or psychotic (with specific diagnosis). In res-
ponse 60 percent of the psychiatrists, 28 percent of the 
clinical psychologists, and 11 percent of the graduate stu-
dents diagnosed the actor as psychotic. No psychiatrist 
diagnosed the actor as mentally healthy while 3 of the clini-
cal psychologists and 5 of the graduate students did. The 
remaining diagnoses were of some type of neurosis. In con-
trol groups that were employed there were no diagnoses of 
psychosis. That psychiatrists, especially, responded in this 
manner to suggestion raises serious questions regarding their 
susceptibility to suggestions made by family members, em-
ployers, and police officers. 
Research done by James Greenley (1975) further supports 
the notion that psychiatrists merely legitimize the decisions 
made by other people regarding control of a person. Greenley 
investigated patients length of stay in a mental hospital as 
a function of the psychiatrist's diagnosis as to the severity 
of mental impairment and the combined effect of family and 
patient desires. The findings indicate that the psychia-
trist's diagnosis bears little relationship to the length 
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of the hospital stay when family and patient desires are 
controlled. The relationship between the latter factor and 
length of stay appears to have an impact "apart from the 
psychiatrist's estimate of the patient's psychiatric condi-
tion" (p.39). Although, as Greenley points out, the data 
aren't conclusive in terms of causal analysis they are clear 
in demonstrating that the psychiatrist-family~patient-hos-
pi tal relationship is more a social process than medical one. 
The investigations made by Donald Caetano (1974) and 
Movahedi Siamak (1975) provide findings very similar to those 
of Rosenhan, Temerlin, and Greenley. Caetano's experimental 
findings provide evidence to support the contention that 
psychiatrists operate largely on the persumption of mental 
illness which severely biases their judgements at least in 
experimental settings. Siamak reports that over 90 percent 
of the biographies that were compiled by college students 
which were highlighted by their bleak experiences were judged 
by professionals to be characteristic of some type of psy-
chiatric disturbance. 
Other research points to the way in which psychiatry 
effects a discrimination on the basis of class in regards to 
admission to mental hospitals and the type of treatment that 
one receives. The classic study of mental health statistics 
in New Haven, Connecticut presented by August Hollingshead 
and Frederick Redlich (1958) revealed several interesting 
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facts. Among them was the finding that the rate of treated 
"psychiatric illness 11 is three times higher for the lowest 
class as for the highest class (four class distinctions be-
ing employed, p.210). For patients in continuous treatment 
(over a six month period) the rate is 3.82 times higher for 
the lowest class. While 99 percent of the lowest class pa-
tients received treatment from state-provided hospitals and 
clinics only 9.6 percent of the highest class patients had 
to turn to these sources. The lowest class schizophrenics 
were receiving either custodial care or organic treatrrent 
(drug therapy, psychosurgery, shock therapy, etc.) in 90.9 
percent of the cases while only 48.2 percent of the highest 
class schizophrenics received this type of treatment (insofar 
as you can refer to custodial care as treatment). While the 
picture is not particularly bright for any class in terms of 
"treatrrent" it still represents significant discrimination 
against those at the bottom of the social ladder. At this 
stage of investigation it would be premature to launch into 
a detailed analysis of the role of class distinctions in the 
etiology of mental disorders. The discussion of Marxism and 
mental illness in Roger Bastide (1972:18-21), however, raises 
the possibility of explicating the role of contradictions 
which are most extreme at the lower end of the social spec-
trum and the possible role of stressful conditions being most 
prevalent at this level is also mentioned. Unfortunately, 
Bastide merely mentions such possibilities without offering 
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any extended analysis or development. 
RESPONSES OF OPPRESSION TO CALLS FOR HELP 
The discussion to this point should not be construed 
as an argument to the effect that there are not any people 
that are characterized by mental confusion, perceptual prob-
lems, inability to grapple with aspects of reality that are 
necessary for existence, and so forth. The contention is 
that the medical model and the traditional theories of psy-
chiatry do not give us even a modicum of understanding about 
these problems of living; what they are, where they originate 
in human social relations, or how they might be solved mean-
ingfully. 
We can begin to formulate answers to these questions 
only by viewing the sometimes bizarre and confused communi-
cations of seemingly insane people as complaints about op-
pressiveness in their social environments or simply as fran-
tic calls for help. To localize the problem within the in-
dividual is to respond with further oppressiveness to those 
calls for help. 
Taking the fragmented and "crazy"· communications of 
individuals experiencing cognitive distress seriously is a 
solid theme running through most of the "antipsychiatry" 
literature. Tackling these messages represents a difficult 
task at best. Laing at one point suggested a useful strategy 
which, unfortunately, he has failed to develop. 
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As we begin from microsituations and work up to 
macrosituations we find that the apparent irration-
ality of behavior on a small scale takes on a cer-
tain intelligibility when one sees it in context. 
One moves, for example from the apparent irration-
ality of the single "psychotic" individual to the 
intelligibility of that irrationality within the 
context of the family. The irrationality of the 
family in its turn must be placed within the con-
text of its encompassing networks. These further 
networks must be seen within the context of yet 
larger organizations and institutions. These larger 
contexts do not exist out there on some periphery 
of social space: they pervade the interstices of 
all that is comprised by them. (Laing, 1969:15) 
Still the analysis framed by Laing moves little be-
yond the analysis of "psychotic" irrationality made more 
rational by viewing it in the context of the family. What 
is needed is a fuller understanding of "psychotic" behavior 
as a problem in the sociology of consciousness and knowledge. 
Berger and Pullberg have touched on this problem as far as 
contending that consciousness and mental health are cultural-
ly relative. To challenge alienated consciousness is to 
place oneself in jeopardy of being defined as mentally "un-
healthy" and also removes one from full participation in 
the social constructions of reality. Alienated or false 
consciousness, strangely enough, may be defined as mental 
health or stability which ipso facto places the seeing 
through of alienation and reification, or the development of 
true consciousness, at the very edge of "sanity." 
It [isn't] necessary or even likely that an alien-
ated consciousness is subjectively experienced as 
psychological "heal th" is a function of the social 
situation. If the latter is defined in alienated 
terms, then only those who share this definition 
will be psychologically "healthy". For instance, 
in a society that understands it institutions as 
an interaction between divine and demonic forces, 
an understanding of these institutions in other 
terms is likely to be allied with a psychologi-
cally "unhealthy" condition or will lead there if 
held on to stubbornly in the face of the socially 
acceptable explanation of the world. (Berger and 
Pullberg, 1965:200) 
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Therefore the possibility emerges for the person who finally 
sees through the "insanity" and oppressiveness of the world 
of today and who proposes a "sane" alternative that he or 
she may at that very point be close to insanity by virtue of 
not being able to share and thus construct the necessary 
social dimensions of reality (i.e. objectivation and ob-
jectification) for want of common symbols and sentiments. 
This insight helps us understand and extend Kupers' (1976: 
119) discussion of the possibilities of personal stress and 
confusion that may be experienced by one who refuses to be 
numb to the reification that occurs in everyday life. 
Some individuals more than others, for some rea-
son, refuse to be • • • numbed. But when they pro-
claim their beliefs, at whatever level of develop-
ment, they are denied validation in the areas where 
their beliefs contradict the conventional conscious-
ness. Repeated enough, in the right combination, 
this devalidation can create areas where these 
people are unable to evaluate the truth or merit of 
their own perceptions and beliefs. They cannot test 
social reality because they have no way at that mo-
ment to challenge the united presentation of the 
conventional view by significant others in their 
lives. If they refuse to surrender or alter their 
course, seemingly sporadic events may add up to a 
consistent pattern whereby they may become unable 
to differ with the increasingly consolidated at-
tribution by others that they are first different, 
then strange, and finally mad. 
Similar, but less insightful observations are made by John 
44 
Berger (1974:135), Halleck (1971:21-26), Cooper (1973a:l55), 
and Laing (1973a:75-94). 
Two other general pathways lead from conventional real-
ity to some other perception or behavioral mode. The first 
is the mystification of oppression and the second is defec-
tive socialization. 
When the source of oppression is mystified and "hid-
den" from the direct perception of an individual the res-
ponse is likely to be one of frustration that is expressed 
inappropriately. A very oversimplified everyday experience 
is illustrative of this general response. Often while car-
rying on a conversation one or both parties begins acting 
rather nervously; fidgeting, squirming - the tenor and vol-
ume of the conversation go up as tolerance and rational 
thinking go down. Finally, one member suddenly jumps up 
and turns off a loud television, radio, or stereo; for a 
length of time the source of frustration and anxiety was not 
perceived. As soon as it was perceived solution of the 
problem was straightforward. Life, unfortunatley, is not 
always so simple. The alienation and reification that per-
vades modern industrial life obscures and mystifies the 
various sources of oppression and frustration. Added to 
this already clouded consciousness is the mystification one 
thrusts upon oneself by virtue of the fear that is experi-
enced when one does uncover the source of oppression; one 
sure way to elicit increased oppression is to identify its 
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source. If this problem is not initially perceived by the 
oppressed individual or group its stark reality is thrust 
upon them after protests, complaints, or observations have 
been vocalized. Thus, as Szasz (1974:124) points out, an 
individual may mask his or her complaints in very bizarre 
ways; what he refers to as protolanguage. This form of com-
munication serves its user in a manner similar to the way 
in which Latin terms used to refer to sexual organs do; 
they allow one to address delicate subjects while disowning 
distrubing implications. Hysteria, according to Szasz, is 
the employment of bodily signs as a general request for help. 
These signs mean something very different for the therapist 
with a medical orientation. The person may indeed acquire 
someone to listen to their complaints which would tend to 
reinforce the use of bodily signs and would also keep the 
therapist from really "hearing" the complaints. The person 
communicating in this manner may be very successful in get-
ting the psychiatrist to accept the role they are playing 
but inevitably the actor gets typecast - a professional 
actor's most dreaded disease, because thereafter they will 
never be accepted in another role (p.244-245). This is an 
inherent feature of traditional psychiatry according to 
Szasz; the result of a misplaced focus on "mental illness" 
rather than on communications. Therefore the patient speak-
ing and listening in terms of complaints engages in a lop-
sided relationship with a psychiatrist who is listening and 
46 
speaking in terms of mental illness; the patient will in-
evitably shift over to the perception of reality inherent in 
the latter mode. The focus is now on internal factors 
rather than the distressing aspects of one's environment. 
To Szasz (1974:246) this is: 
• • • the situation in which most persons called 
mentally ill now find themselves. By and large, 
such persons impersonate the roles of helpless-
ness, hopelessness, weakness, and often of bodily 
illness - when, in fact, their actual roles per-
tain to frustrations, unhapinesses, and perplexi-
ties due to interpersonal, social, and ethical 
conflicts.* 
Discussion of the idiom cf demonic possession in 
Gananath Obeysekere (1975) provides cross-cultural support 
for Szasz's contentions. Obeysekere relates the case of a 
Sinhalese woman living in an oppressive family and marital 
environment butressed by an extremely misogynic culture. 
The woman voices her complaints via the well defined cul-
tural idiom of demonic possession. Much like the case of 
the Western hysteric, our Sinhalese woman is typecast in the 
role of the demon-possessed person. Thus, she must go 
through all of the prescribed religious ceremonies. In ad-
hering to the idiom of demonic possession she gains several 
valuable things although she still lives in virtually the 
same conditions as before albeit with a new role: she gains 
the ear and sympathy of husband, priest, family, and com-
*szasz is quick to point out that this impersonation 
is not always a consciously planned strategy, though often 
it is. 
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munity; and, in the midst of the religious ceremonies "spir-
its" speak through her often voicing requests which when 
granted provide some niceties for her. 
There are two general sources of defective socializa-
tion; biological disorders and family structures that pre-
clude "normal" sociopsychological development of children. 
The first source is fairly self-evident so we won't take it 
up here (this does not represent a denial of the relevance 
of factors related to oppression, however) • The second 
source has received much attention as a result of Gregory 
Bateson's (1972) observations regarding the "double-bind" 
structures in the families of schizophrenics. An interest-
ing study performed by Morton Schatzman (1975) reveals the 
potential relationship between cruel or oppressive child-
rearing practices and sociopsychic distresses. The stud.y is 
especially interesting because the subject, Daniel Schreber, 
was analyzed by Freud. Although Freud and Schreber never 
met, Freud analyzed his disorder by using his published 
memoirs as data. As Schatzman points out, however, Freud 
overlooked the importance of another source of data that 
still exists. These data are the eighteen books and booklets 
written by Schreber's father who was a physician, orthope-
dist, and pedagogue. Many of the elder Schreber's writings 
are about his methods of child-rearing; methods he applied 
to his own children. Freud knew of Schreber's father and, 
if interested, could have learned (if in fact, he didn't 
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know) that Schreber's older brother shot and killed himself 
at age thirty-eight. Schreber, more "fortunate," became a 
mental patient at forty-two and spent thirteen of his last 
twenty-seven years in mental asylums, where he died. Sadly, 
the irony goes further: 
Irony is everywhere. An eminent pedagogue has a 
psychotic son; it does not hurt his reputation. 
Freud, an avid reader, neglects books on child 
rearing - as do his followers - by a man whose 
son's childhood experiences he tries to derive. 
German parents rear their children by the ideas of 
a man whom many people now would see as sadistic 
or mentally ill. (Schatzman, 1975:93) 
In the case of Schreber the dialectical relationship between 
a cultural level of knowledge or consciousness and its re-
flections and its reciprocal supportive role in microlevel 
structures like the family are open to view. These issues 
will be taken up in the next chapter in our discussion of 
the politics of the family. 
Though Berger and Luckmann say very little regarding 
the incidence of insanity their general observation that 
reality maintenance in society is relatively successful and 
that therefore insanity will be relatively uncommon provides 
a necessary backdrop to our discussion. These challenges 
to socially constructed reality will not be serious as long 
as they can be diffused and localized within individual 
people. Should numbers of people begin sharing an alterna-
tive conception of reality then the danger of a massive so-
cietal shift in realities is present. Such "mass madness" 
(i.e. revolution) is feared because the outcome is unknown. 
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Conditions of life may be more or less desirable at present: 
in any case they are certainly more concrete than what is 
known about the future. Massive transformations are indeed 
rare, and therefore this minimal reality shifting of insanity 
can be handled ordinarily by an aspect of the conceptual 
machinery of symbolic universe-maintenance ref erred to by 
Berger and Luckmann as therapy. 
Therapy entails the application of conceptual ma-
chinery to ensure that actual or potential deviants 
stay within the institutionalized definitions of 
reality, or, in other words, to prevent the "in-
habitants" of a given universe from "emigrating." 
It does this by applying the legitimating apparatus 
to individual "cases" ••• Therapy in one form or 
another is a global phenomenon. Its specific in-
stitutional arrangements, from exorcism t:o psy-
choanalysis, from pastoral care to personnel coun-
seling programs, belong, of course, under the cate-
gory of social control • • • Since therapy must 
concern itself with deviations from the "offical" 
definitions of reality, it must develop a conceptual 
machinery to account for such deviations and to 
maintain the realities thus challenged. This re-
quires a body of knowledge that includes a theory 
of deviance, a diagnostic apparatus, and a concep-
tual system for the "cure of souls." (Berger and 
Luckrnann, 1967:112-113) 
Powerful institutional forces are responsible for keeping 
sociopsychic problems within the framework of a medically 
oriented psychiatry. Medicine and psychiatry are in them-
selves very powerful social institutions which ipso facto 
will be very difficult to change; and yet our analysis de-
mands that very thing. Western psychiatry is a classic ex-
ample of the class struggle. Its positions are typically 
filled with those of elevated status and privilege endowed 
with the power and predilection to treat men and women as 
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conunodities; as purely objects. Its practice is enshrounded 
with alienation, reification, mystification and ideology. 
An additional significant source of support for the 
maintenance of the ideology of mental illness resides in the 
nature of the politics of everyday life. These political 
structures are able to maintain their distributions of power 
even when challenged by referring the challenger to the psy-
chiatrist as an either severely neurotic or psychotic "case." 
As we have already evidenced, this presentation of the "case" 
as one of mental illness tends to predispose the context to 
one in which the goal is an appropriate psychiatric diag-
nosis. By providing such a category and the dynamics in-
volved in doing so the challenger is "cooled out" and the 
political structure is maintained. 
Responses to calls of sociopsychic distress that are 
not oppressive would attempt to decode and interpret the 
inappropriate or unconventional communications coming from 
the "insane" person. An appreciation of, and a sensitivity 
to, the problems of consciousness on the part of a helping 
agent in these situations is crucial. When these insights 
are shared with the person in distress they could be instru-
mental in minimizing the terror and fear one experiences by 
virtue of "breaking out" of previous perceptions of reality. 
This should help to facilitate interpretation of "psychotic" 
communications that will enable the "therapist" to devise 
alterations in the individuals family, s.chool, or work en-
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vironment to promote a more livable situation for the dis-
tressed person. In her discussion of psychiatric treatment 
in China, Ruth Sidel (1975) suggests that superior success 
in treatment there is based upon procedures and techniques 
that promote interaction with the patient, not isolation as 
is the case in Western mental hospitals. She shows how the 
patient is progressively worked back into social relation-
ships when particularly oppressive or distressing dimensions 
of those relationships have been altered by the therapists 
involved with the patient. Though Chinese psychiatric treat-
ment has some serious drawbacks it does suggest some very 
fruitful alternatives to traditional Western psychiatric 
practice. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE POLITICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE 
In Chapter II we discussed the possibility of grap-
pling with the reality of everyday life in terms of analy-
sis of its political features in relation to the family, 
school, and workplace. It should be stressed that this is 
but one dimension of these structures. In this type of anal-
ysis our attention will focus upon the various similarities 
with "macropolitical" phenomena. This will help to sensi-
tize us to the role of discrediting labels in the mainten-
ance of these "micropolitical" structures. Perhaps the most 
significant similarity is the fact that power or authority 
is distributed inequitably within the political structures 
of everyday life. Thus, in terms of decision-making, for 
example, not all parties involved in living under the ex-
isting conditions of a relationship have equal power in af-
fecting the decision-making from which the conditions derive. 
How much say that children, students, or employees have in 
the decision-making process is up to the discretion of par-
ents, teachers (and administrators, school board, etc.), 
and employers. This is not to say that all parents, teach-
ers, and employers are, therefore, oppressive in terms of 
the power that they possess; the point is, that the poten-
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tial for oppressions ~ exist. There is, however, an in-
herent predisposition toward oppression in that these struc-
tures tend to focus on the needs of those possessing power 
rather than the needs of those who don't. This feature is 
inherent within these structures inasmuch as the needs of 
those without power are not vocalized within the decision-
making process by virtue of being excluded from it except as 
they are perceived by those with power in these spheres. In 
American "macropolitics," for example, those with financial 
power can affect decisions in their favor by financing a pro-
gram of lobbying in which their needs are vocalized within 
the decision-making process; those with less resources are 
incapacitated in this regard.* Those without financial 
clout must often voice their needs through demonstrations, 
rallies, or other forms of dissidence. Similarly in the 
family, for instance, a youngster may resort to protest to 
vocalize his or her needs. In "macropolitics," as we have 
already mentioned, protesters are often labeled as "traitors" 
or "anarchists" or some such label which serves to discredit 
both them and their protests. In "micropoli tics" prates ters 
are often labeled with psychiatric tags which serve to dis-
credit them and their contentions in the service of main-
taining the existing structures involved. 
* Obviously financial power in American politics is 
employed in more ways than lobbying, but this aspect is 
raised simply to illustrate the similarities within the 
politics of everyday life and "macropolitics." 
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The structures of family, school, and workplace over-
lap extensively and to deal with them separately necessitates 
an understanding of their dialectical interrelationships. 
Each structure helps to reinforce or reify the others by em-
phasizing different aspects of the same cultural theme. In 
American society the theme which is of importance to us in 
this analysis is that of dominance/submission. There are 
other themes that both overlap with this one and support it 
in addition to being supported themselves by this basic 
theme. The family is of primary concern in this discussion 
by virtue of being the primary socializer for society and 
therefore considerably more space will be devoted to it. 
THE POLITICS OF THE FAMILY 
The family is the fundamental agency by which a person 
gains entrance into social reality. Ipso facto the family 
mystifies consciousness in that it is thrust onto the in-
fant as a given. Berger and Luckmann explain this feature 
of primary socialization in a manner that allows us to per-
ceive the original source of mystification that confronts 
one in the process of socialization. 
Society presents the candidate for socialization 
with a predefined set of significant others, whom 
he must accept as such with no possibility of opt-
ing for another arrangement • • • This unfair dis-
advantage inherent in the situation of being a 
child has the obvious consequence that, although 
the child is not simply passive in the process of 
his socialization, it is the adults who set the 
rules of the game. The child ~.~an play the game 
with enthusiasm or with sullen, resistance. But, 
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alas, there is no other game around ••• The child 
does not internalize the world of his significant 
others as one of many possible worlds. He inter-
nalizes it as the world, the only existent and only 
conceivable woria • • • Primary socialization thus 
accomplishes what (in hindsight, of course) may be 
seen as the most important confidence trick that 
society plays on the individual - to make appear as 
necessity what is in fact a bundle of contingencies, 
and thus to make meaningful the accident of his 
birth. (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:134-135) (em-
phasis in the original) 
The insight offered here points to an inherent problem of 
oppression in socialization that is subject to either in-
tensification or some degree of liberation. While both are 
objectively possible the former is much nore likely than 
the latter for a number of reasons. The prospects for lib-
eration from a :unidimensiona£ perceptton of reality are pred-
icated upon an understanding on th.e part of the parents 
concerning the nature of social reality. It is not likely 
that this would inevitably follow simply as the result of 
the educational experiences of the parents, as the sociology 
of knowledge is not integrated into the structure of tradi-
tional education. When liberation from constricted percep-
tions of reality does occur it usually operates from the ex-
periential base of a parent who has rejected the Weltan-
schauung of his or her own family and adopted another one, 
or, in the case of the truly marginal person, a number of 
others. This experience "teaches" one that the world of the 
family is something less than inevitable and this knowledge 
can be transmitted to children. Obviously this outcome is 
not very likely for many families. On the other side, there 
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are definite political advantages in getting children to ac-
cept the existing parental world, not the least of which is 
a ready-made legitimating mechanism for their authority and 
power. In other words, unquestioning acceptance of this 
world will ipso facto promote unquestioning acceptance of 
the parents behavior. This will both save time and make 
matters much more manageable. What would necessitate con-
siderable thought and effort (e.g. an answer to the inquis-
itive child's "Why?") is answered with a simple "because." 
Not only does this save time in the inunediate situation but 
it also discourages the child from asking the question again 
in the future. It also informs the child that everything is 
all right as it is: the simple response "because" carries 
with it the message that the status quo is both legitimate 
and obvious. The more oppressive response, "because I said 
so!", speels out the distribution of power in the family 
quite explicitly for the child. It may be accompanied by 
more stringent sanctions which help to hasten the process 
by which the child generalizes these experiences to the in-
hibition of questioning anything. This makes the family 
more manageable and will also help the youngster "fit in" 
the classroom and the work-place. In societies character-
ized by themes of dominance/submission children "are trained 
to obey commands by superiors in pursuit of fixed goals 
rather than to negotiate with equals in response to changing 
conditions." The organizing principles of this type of 
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society are "hierarchy, predictability, and control" which 
are "symbolized by the assembly line, the clock and calendar, 
and the budget - lifeless apparatus to which human beings 
are yoked like beasts of burden. The ideal person for such 
servitude is one who is reliably obedient, predictable, and 
orderly" (Scheff, 1975e:80). Families successful in this 
type of socialization rejoice in having a child that is 
"good" in school and who will be "reliable" on the job. In 
capitalist societies, where bureaucracy abounds and functions 
best with this type of worker, these aspects of socializa-
tion are especially emphasized. This is not meant to be a 
unilinear argument of causality postulating that capitalism 
causes sociopsychic distress. Some of these same organiza-
tional forms and interrelationships exist in a variety of 
cultures. It merely points out the fact that these types of 
socialization objectives exacerbate the already inherent 
mystification of consciousness that exists in the nature of 
the family. As Kupers (1976:118) contends, this type of 
society promotes socialization practices which disavow the 
existence of oppression even in the very midst of it. This 
we have noted before in his observation that the child is 
"encouraged to ignore or be numbed" to certain aspects of 
the environment. The child is encouraged, for example, to 
be "numb to parental deception" and to "rationalize that 
even blatantly arbitrary punishment is 'for his own good' " 
(p.119). In the case of Schreber, to which we referred 
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earlier, Schatzman demonstrates in an analysis of Dr. Schre-
ber's (Schreber's father) writings on child-rearing that the 
emphasis was on the total unquestioning obedience of the 
child for the child's own good. A passage from his work 
quoted by Schatzman (p.106) illustrates this tactic of using 
various types of punishment in order to be: 
• • • master of the child forever. From now on 
a glance, a word, a single threatening gesture, is 
sufficient to rule the child. One should keep in 
mind that one shows the child the greatest kind-
ness in this in that one saves him from many hours 
of tension which hinder him from thriving and also 
frees him from all those inner spirits of torment 
which very easily grow up vigorously into more 
serious and insurmountable enemies of life. (D.G.M. 
Schreber, 1858:60-61) 
The "delusional" response of the younger Schreber was 
that "God himself was on my side in his fight against me" 
(Daniel P. Schreber, 1955:79). Dr. Schreber advocated a 
parental stance that was directed to instilling the belief 
in the child that not only was it wrong for him to keep 
things from the parent but that it was not even possible. 
As Berger and Luckmann imply, if the child maintains parti-
cipation in this parental world he or she will, in fact, be 
incapable of keeping anything from the parent. What are the 
implications of these situations in which a child is not 
permitted to develop autonomy of thinking? From a Meadian 
perspective one can speculate as to a breakdown in the de-
velopment of communication between the "I" and the "me" in 
that making indications to oneself about external events 
would be severely constricted. In fact, one could question 
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the real possibility of the full development of a "self" in 
such contexts. Laing provides some relevant observations on 
this point in his discussion of the case of a chronic schizo-
phrenic girl (Julie) and her family relationships. The 
mother in this case related to Julie as a mere extension of 
herself in a manner that disabled her to develop any autonomy. 
As Laing (1973a:81) puts it: "genuine self-action seems never 
to have become established to any extent, but instead all 
action is in total compliance and conformity with outside 
directives." At an early age Julie therefore did all of the 
"normal" things that children do with a subtle distinction -
"In Julie's case, her actions appear to have been trained by 
her mother, but 'she' was not 'in' them." Later we will 
pick up at the point at which her "normalcy" became "madness," 
but for now let's examine Laing's observations regarding 
Julie's psychotic episodes. He recounts that, although it 
was possible "to carry on a verbal exchange of a kind, but 
without her seeming to have any overall unity but rather a 
constellation of quasi-autonomous partial systems, it was 
difficult to speak to 'her' 11 (p.95). Though one sees pro-
cess (the "I, 11 according to Mead) there is little evidence 
of structure (the "me 11 ). In such a case reflective con-
sciousness would appear to be an impossibility. This in 
mind, consider Laing's following observation (p.97): 
In so far as reflective awareness was absent, 
11 memory," for which reflective awareness would 
seem to be prerequisite, was patchy. All her life 
seemed to be contemporaneous. The absence of a 
total experience of her being as a whole meant that 
she lacked the unified experience on which to base a 
clear idea of the "boundary" of her being. 
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It would undoubtedly be legitimate to contend that Meadian 
social psychology would allow that a nonhuman animal could 
have an "I" (i.e. a minimal biopsychological functioning) 
but it would firmly deny the possibility for this organism 
to possess a "me." Conversely then, if a person like Julie 
were denied whatever minimal autonomy is necessary to develop 
a "me" then there would either be fragmented partial "me' s" 
as "chunks 11 of memory but no coherent "me" capable of think-
ing or intrapersonal interaction in the Meadian sense; the 
person would simply exist as an "I." This point requires 
much further investigation and clarification, but such an 
endeavor falls outside of the immediate scope of this paper. 
The point to be made is that oppressive factors in the family 
may seriously disable the person's ability to identify and 
object to that oppression; such persons are locked into a 
type of "double-jeopardy" situation. That is to say that 
they may be subjected to oppression which results in a 
break-down in normal development of the "self" in the first 
place which leads to unconventional modes of reacting to 
that oppression in the second place. 
What kind of political problems are raised for the 
family when protests, however inappropriate or bizarre, are 
"vocalized" or communicated? If the protests are taken 
seriously and viewed within the family and the family within 
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increasing macropolitical structures, then alteration of 
structures and redistributions of power have to be viewed as 
alternatives. History provides one unequivocal observation 
in this regard: those in positions of power are the least 
willing to deal with change as a viable alternative. In 
most cases this is not even a possible conception for the 
persons with power; reality for them is static and nothing 
else is real or legitimate; or alternatives are perceived as 
threatening to that power. Within "macropolitical" and 
"micropolitical" contexts it is easiest to handle the dis-
comfort of dissidence or protest by labeling it as "trea-
sonous" in the former case and as nmental illness" in the 
latter. The legitimating structures identify the dissidents 
as obviously "criminal" or obviously "mad," respectively. 
In both cases the argument seems logical because there are 
very similar "deviants" whose deviations are not the direct 
expression of protest. One points to criminals that violate 
the value system of the society by "acquiring goods" that 
they have not purchased and to which they have no "legal" 
claim. The political dissident also violates the value 
system by criticizing it in its institutional forms; a mis-
guided logic equates the two violations. One also points 
to persons with observable organic defects whose violation 
of norms of behavior include no direct protests. An equally 
misguided logic contends that similar norm violations are 
the symptomatology of some other less observable "organic" 
62 
defect. In both cases labels are employed to discredit the 
protester. According to Scheff (1975d) the ambiguity of 
what "mental illness" is and the collusion of family members 
against the prepatient results in many questionable corn-
rnitments. In Julie's case Laing clearly unmasks the dynamics 
of discrediting labeling in an effort to maintain the power 
distribution in her family • 
• • • the original pattern of her [Julie's] actions 
was entirely in conformity with what ner parents 
held to be good and praiseworthy. Then, she was 
for a time 11 bad," that is those very things her par-
ents most did not want to see her do or hear her say 
or to believe existed in her, she "came out with." 
We cannot at present say why this was so. But that 
she was capable of saying and doing such things was 
almost incredible to her parents. All that emerged 
was totally unsuspected. They first tried to dis-
count it, but as the offense grew they strove vio-
lently to repudiate it. It was a great relief, 
the·refore, when, instead of saying that her mother 
wouldn't let her live, she said that her mother had 
murdered a child. Then all could be forgiven. 
"Poor Julie was ill. She was not responsible. How 
could I ever have believed for one moment that she 
meant what she said to me? I've always tried my 
best to be a good mother to her." (Laing, 1973a:74) 
Yes, poor Julie; her "psychotic" communications have no basis 
in reality. That is obvious because the poor girl says some 
extremely bizarre things: "a child has been murdered"; "I'm 
a tolled bell" (or "told belle .. ); "I'm tailor-made" or "I'm a 
tailored maid"; and, "this child is dead and not dead." 
David Cooper (1973b:l63) relates a similar case of an eight-
year-old boy diagnosed as a schizophrenic in "autistic with-
drawal. 11 
This beautiful boy of eight was brought into my 
room by his mother and father, and he wore a badge 
saying, "It's wrong to eat people." He grimaced and 
gesticulated and could not (or perhaps more rele-
vantly, did not want to) sit in one place and take 
part in the discussion. His mother • • • was con-
suming the child in terms of an orientation of her 
whole mind and body to his "welfare" - protecting 
him from rough friends at school and an overly 
punitive headmaster who smelled out a "wrong one." 
But she was erecting this abdominal wall around her 
son because she was being starved, in terms beyond 
the sexual, by her husband, who taught at a· uni-
versd;ty west of London. He was starving her be-
cause he was being starved of any sort of real in-
tercourse with others by academic bureaucracy, which 
mediated to him the first-world famine situation 
(which seems to be hardly recognized by university 
administrators, but which is protested with in-
creasing frequency by radical students - with in-
creasing effect). 
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Although some of Cooper's observations are a bit dated 
and some of his semantics imply a psychoanalytic framework 
that we would reject here, he does make a couple of things 
clear. First, that the youngster's conununications related 
in a real sense to his family situation and were indicators 
of its oppressive components. Secondly, Cooper seems to 
grasp the critical role that general cultural themes that 
are reflected in work, school, and family play. It would 
be hard to overemphasize the importance of this dialectical 
relationship. It is also demonstrated in the Schreber case. 
One of Dr. Schreber's child-rearing books sold nearly forty 
editions and was translated into seven languages. How could 
·such a parental failure advocating "torture chamber" measures 
(e.g. cold water baths at six months of age to toughen up 
the baby, and a series of restraining devices to promote 
good posture) be a popular source of parental education? 
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The observations made by Schatzman suggest the existence of 
cultural legitimations that supported Dr. Schreber's ap-
proach; this could have been the popularity of the moral 
stance of harsh discipline to establish strong will power 
to withstand temptation. That his authoritarian approach 
was so widely employed suggests that the theme supporting 
his approach was itself modified through its intensification. 
Schatzman (1975:116) suggests that we "remember that Hitler 
and his peers were raised when Dr. Schreber's books, preach-
ing household totalitarianism, were popular." 
The form of social relations in capitalism tends to 
heighten the problems in autonomy that we have discussed in 
that children within the family tend to be viewed as objects 
or conunodities. In the following passage Juliet Mitchell 
(1976:204-205) points out an important factor in oppression 
and the mystification of consciousness within the family. 
At present, reproduction in our society is of ten 
a kind of sad mimicry of production. Work in a cap-
italistic society is an alienation of labor ••• 
maternity is often a caricature of this. The bi-
ological product - the child - is treated as if 
it were a solid product. Parenthood becomes a 
kind of substitute for work, an activity in which 
the child is seen as an object created by the 
mother, in the same way as a conunodity is created 
by the worker • • • The child as an autonomous per-
son, inevitably threatens the activity which claims 
to create it continually merely as a possession of 
the parent. Possessions are felt as extensions of 
the self. The child as a possession is supremely 
this. Anything the child does is therefore a threat 
to the mother herself • • • There are few more pre-
c·arious ventures on which to base a life. (emphasis 
in the original) 
One is amazed at the degree to which mothers "compete" via 
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their "products." The comparisons and "one-upmanship" that 
of ten occurs between mothers reminds one of owners showing 
off the qualities of their possessions such as automobiles, 
paintings, houses, and so on. That women will often "train" 
their youngsters to do the "tricks" that grant her prestige 
or honor places undo pressures for the obedience of the 
child. 
Having dealt at some length with the politics of the 
family we have overlapped in some ways the relevant aspects 
of the politics of school and workplace. We will now, very 
briefly, focus our attention on these areas of everyday life. 
THE POLITICS OF THE SCHOOL 
What the child is exposed to in the school is a series 
of.dulling and mystifying experiences in which he or she is 
trained to accept authority regardless of its specific char-
acteristics. That schools, in conjunction with other struc-
tures (especially the family and workplace) , have been suc-
cessful in this effort is evidenced in a variety of ways. 
One strong indicator comes from the little research that has 
been done on obedience such as the Milgram study. This is 
the least painful way for society to measure the success of 
its oppressive ideological apparatus. More painfully we are 
forced to learn (more accurrately, we have failed to learn) 
from the inhumane behavior witnessed at Auschwitz, My Lai, 
and Kent State, for example. The schools continually func-
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tion to legitimate what is arbitrary authority in the family. 
In "Death at an Early Age" Jonathan Kozol (1976:386), a 
school teacher, explains the damaging nature of schooling 
in Boston. 
• • • the whole concept of respect for unearned 
and undeserved authority is bitter and brittle and 
back-breaking to children, whether rich or poor, or 
black or white, within these kinds of schools ••• 
No child in his heart, unless drugged by passivity, 
will pay obeisance to authortty unless authority 
has earned it ••• There is too much respect for 
authority in the Boston schools, and too little re-
spect for the truth. If there were more of the 
latter, there would be less need of the former, and 
the atmosphere of the Boston Schools would not have 
to be ••• the atmosphere of a crumbling dicta-
torship in time of martial law. 
In recent years schools have been under attack as 
failing to educate students as they should. In their anal-
ysis of this "failure," Paul Lauter and Florence Howe (1976: 
390-408) suggest that schools have really been "very, indeed 
horryfyingly, successful" (p.392). Lauter and Howe call 
attention to the objectives that parents and employers en-
vision for schools in America. They refer to a Harris poll 
showing that 62 percent of the parents questioned thought 
that "maintaining descipline is more important than student 
self-inquiry" (p.394). They contend that schools have 
"served the desires of business for a disciplined and ac-
quiescent work force" (p.394). The schools have, by and 
large, according to their account, been instrumental in con-
tinued oppression of those at the lower end of the social 
spectrum through maintenance of the status quo. 
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The confusion and obfuscation of educational goals 
merely serves. to mystify the development of consciousness in 
this country. Schools pick up where the family needn't tread 
to extend what Kupers, (1976) as we have discussed earlier, 
refers to as numbness. He suggests that the school is re-
sponsible for passing on deceptions regarding the history of 
capitalism. Obvious to Laing (1973b:ll0) is the role of 
schools in "the mystification of experience." 
ln order to rationalize our industrial-military 
complex, we have to destroy our capacity to see 
clearly any more what is in front of, and to im-
agine what is beyond, our noses. Long before a 
thermonuclear war can come about, we have had to 
lay waste our sanity. We begin with the children. 
It is imperative to catch them in time. Without 
the most thorough and rapid brainwashing their 
dirty minds would see through our dirty tricks. 
Children are not yet fools, but we shall turn them 
into imbeciles like ourselves, with high IQ's if 
possible. 
As the contradictions of our world are internalized by 
children then they too can share and propagate the mysti-
fication of reality. In this way, according to Laing (1973b: 
124) , "the texture • of these socially shared hallucin-
ations [becomesj what we call reality, and our collusive 
madness • • • what we call sanity." 
The school encounters dissidents and disposes then in 
the manner of discrediting through labeling. Students are 
labeled either as "behavior problems" or mentally disturbed 
if they don't fit in "smoothly" to the bureaucratic organ-
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First, a few comments regarding alienation in the con-
text of insanity. When the workplace is characterized by 
extreme alienation at least two things occur. One, the male 
worker inevitably carries the numbing experience of work 
home to his family where, being the possessor of virtually 
unlimited power, he may respond oppressively toward his wife 
and children out of feelings of frustration, powerlessness, 
and irritation. He often learns various techniques in op-
pression from his employer and incorporates these features 
of oppression into his own family structure. Another very 
real consequence of experiencing alienation in the workplace 
is the desire to be "free" and "autonomous" while not on the 
job. The typical strategy to effect this is to emphasize 
that aspect of life that does not, in his perception, belong 
to the boss. In the process of privatization, however, the 
worker finds himself in the role of consumer as he turns to-
ward "fulfillment" in campers, boats, sunnner homes, expensive 
vacations, and so on. To purchase these commodities he finds 
himself ever more tightly bound to the workplace. Often he 
takes on another job to "make the payments." The result is 
that the worker is even more numbed to his alienation than 
before. He is also modeling, and very often vocalizing, a 
work ethic for his children. He begins to perceive his role 
toward them in terms of their own preparation for the work-
place. 
The special case of paranoia in the workplace has been 
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ization.* The psychiatrist has played a vital role in this 
process according to Simon Madison (1973:127), showing his 
usefulness in "his ability to label what is seen to be threat-
ening behavior as manifestations of mental illness." 
Here as in no other place there is a deluge of record-
keeping which effects almost continuous monitoring of the 
student's behavior beginning with preschool. A common no-
tation on these records follows the form "needs more self-
control." Taken very literally this concern of teachers, 
parents, and administrators reflects a general objective of 
schools within society: To make the youngster ''obedient, 
predictable, and orderly" in order that he or she will be 
ideally suited for "the assembly line, the clock and calendar, 
and the budget" (Scheff, 1975e:80). 
THE POLITICS OF THE WORKPLACE 
Much of what we have said up to this point overlaps 
with a discussion of the politics of the workplace and much 
work has already been done in this area especially in terms 
of alienation. Therefore we will deal very briefly with a 
few of the most relevant political factors of the workplace. 
* It is an interesting problem of knowledge that re-
sulted in the late 1960's on college campuses and many high 
schools when there was a "collective" movement or deviance 
that effected some changes, however minimal. It becomes dif-
ficult to label these dissidents as a "collective behavior 
problem" and therefore a shift to label these students as 
"communists", "radicals", or some such label to discredit 
their complaints about the bureaucratic sterility of ed-
ucation 
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discussed by Edwin Lemert (1972}. Paranoia as dealt with 
here by Lemert relates to bureaucratically organized work 
more than to factory or assembly line work per se. In these 
complex organizations a multitude of informal procedures and 
sanctions are incorporated into its everyday functioning in 
addition to those that are formalized. To point these out 
very often consitutes a serious faux pas in the perception 
of one's superiors in an organization. As Lemert (p.251) 
puts it: 
The individual is an ambiguous figure whose be-
havior is uncertain, whose loyalty can't be count-
ed on. In short, he is a person who can't be 
trusted because he threatens to expose informal 
power structures. This, we believe, is the es-
sential reason for the frequently encountered 
idea that the paranoid person is "dangerous." 
The "paranoid" person may perceive, for example, that 
an informal meeting between powerful figures has preceded 
the ongoing formal meeting; the former meeting having been 
the one in which the decisions were really made. If the 
"paranoid 11 (more accurately something like the "perceptive 
one"} is so indiscreet as to point out this informal pro-
cedure, he or she will thus initiate an uncomfortable and 
embarrassing episode. Uncomfortable in that confrontation, 
a rare thing in "manipulated meetings," is open and direct; 
embarrassing because the real distribution of power is laid 
bare. What Lemert observes is that the informal and formal 
mechanisms respond quickly to exclude the "paranoid" from 
participating in matters in which he or she could further 
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disrupt the smooth "normal" operations of the organization. 
One way is to place the "paranoid" in a "harmless" job. 
Another is to systematically restrict his or her access to 
important information and processes. A third strategy is 
to affix the label "paranoid" to the individual. It is rel-
atively easy to legitimate the label in that many formal or 
procedural rules can be called into play to discredit the 
"paranoid's" insight. A superior, for instance, could re-
spond by saying: "Now, John calm down. Yor're just upset. 
You know as well as I do that this committee operates ac-
cording to specified procedure. Don't be so paranoid!" The 
systematic exclusion of the "paranoid" will very often effect 
a self-fulfilling prophecy of these earlier allusions to his 
paranoia. If he maintains his indiscreet posture he may 
soon find himself fired on psychological grounds as he re-
sponds to the exclusionary tactics of his associates. He 
may also find himself in a mental hospital grappling with 
the same dynamics in a different setting. 
In all forms of the workplace any effort to organize 
labor is met firmly with a strategy of discrediting labels. 
The history of the labor movement is one of allusions to 
criminality, treason, communism, and other deviant categories 
on the part of labor organizers. The relative lack of en-
thusiasm to organize on the part of workers attest to their 
own mystified or reif ied consciousness or numbness emanating 
from the collusion of family, school, workplace and supportive 
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legitimating ideologies such as psychiatry and criminal jus-
tice in the use of discrediting labels to maintain socially 
constructed realities. 
CHAPTER V 
A RADICAL MODEL FOR INTERPRETING 
SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN LIVING 
A serious danger at this point in any argument would 
be to unquestioningly accept the proposed perspective on 
the basis of its plausibility. This very problem has been 
identified as a central feature of the critique of tradition-
al psychiatric approaches that this paper has offered. Im-
portant questions must be asked and acceptable answers g~ven 
lest we "launch off" on another myth-ridden journey into the 
human mind. For example, what does this perspective on mental 
distress predict? What findings would lend support to this 
approach? A strategy for the presentation of such issues 
that will be employed in this chapter is the development of 
a set of propositions and corollaries that should be tested 
to provide indications as to the acceptability of a radical 
sociology of knowledge framework in the analysis of insanity. 
A major advantage of this tactic is increased clarity of the 
approach by virtue of its explication in propositional form. 
In the development of the propositions that follow attention 
is focused primarily upon theoretical content and their im-
plications. Therefore all of the methodological issues raised 
by a particular proposition will not be addressed here. 
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Suffice it to say that adherence to a strictly positivistic 
approach is not the answer to the majority of research ques-
tions that are generated by the following propositions. 
Those questions are necessarily characterized to a large 
degree by phenomenological inquiry and sociohistorical anal-
ysis for which strict positivism is poorly equipped (which 
would seem to demonstrate its general methodological inade-
quacy). Nevertheless, there are examples of some alternative 
methodologies that have already been employed which are sug-
gestive of possible strategies for deriving some of the data 
that are not ascertainable by traditional methodologies. For 
example, some ethnomethodologists like Alan Blum (1970) have 
offered phenomenological analyses of language as it is em-
ployed within psychiatric settings. Also, Armand Mauss 
(1975:319-356) has presented a sociohistorical perception of 
* the concept of mental illness as a social movement. De-
velopment of methodologies similar to these will undoubtedly 
provide some of the necessary research tools. 
The propositions are stated very generally and are far 
from being exhaustive. They are arranged in a manner that 
tends to move from the broader issues of insanity to those 
* Mauss' approach is in response to Herbert Blumer's 
(1971) contention that social problems must be perceived as 
collective behavior. Blumer's call for a heightened socio·· 
logical sensitivity to the way in which societies respond to 
their various problems and in doing so largely determine the 
premises upon which they will be perceived is certainly shown 
to be relevant in the case of insanity. 
that are more specific. 
PROPOSITION I. That sociohistorical analysis will 
show that the concept of mental illness and the 
patterns of societal response to it are social con-
structions deriving from the massive transforma-
tion of social relationships that occurred in the 
shift from feudalism to capitalism. 
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In the historical period just referred to by this 
proposition numerous new and different social arrangements 
emerged. John and Virginia Demos (1973) offer a brilliant 
analysis of the way in which the concept of adolescence also 
emerged within this period and Rothman (1971) related the 
manner in which social changes in this period led to new 
social responses to old and new problems. The following 
three corollaries point to some of the factors within de-
veloping capitalism that have been instrumental in molding 
the concept of mental illness and the patterns of social 
response to it. 
COROLLARY IA. That with the development of capi-
talism the workplace and conditions of living ex-
perienced increasing complexity such that many in-
dividuals that could have functioned adequately 
within an agrarian setting found it increasingly 
difficult to cope with everging labor requirements. 
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The many components that undergird successful competi-
tion in the labor market are easy to take for granted. When 
compared with the requirements within feudal society, how-
ever, the number of required skills and attributes that go 
into finding and holding a job in capitalist society are 
multitudinous. For instance, one must complete enough 
schooling to at least read and in many cases a prospective 
employee must possess some minimal academic degree. If one 
wants to excel in the labor pool he or she must plan suf-
ficiently ahead to acquire the special training or education 
required by a position that one may not even apply for until 
several years later such as in any position requiring a grad-
uate degree. One must also be able to arrange for the neces-
sities of everyday life - housing, making up a budget, shop-
ping, transportation, filing income tax returns, filling out 
all kinds of forms, and so on. The mental skills required 
in advanced capitalism are many. Increasing complexity of 
labor and living arrangements may contribute in some ways to 
the actual incidence of mental disorders by virtue of ex-
acerbating an individual's confusion or perceptual difficul-
ties. More importantly, though, this increasing complexity 
undoubtedly accounts for extension of the label of mental 
illness to encompass a wide range of behavioral difficulties 
raised by a new set of social arrangements. 
An analysis of labor market changes over the last 200 
years and the reported rates of mental illness should show 
77 
a significant relationship between the two; the more complex 
the labor requirements the higher the reported incidence of 
mental disorders. 
COROLLARY IB. That massive urbanization and in-
creased social and geographical mobility produced 
a shift in responsibility from the family to society 
for the care of those experiencing mental diff icul-
ties. 
At the same time that increasing social complexity 
bro.a~dened the .. definition of mental deviance, family networks 
became increasingly fractionalized and less capable of nor-
malizing such behavior. In previous social relationships, 
such as the extended family rooted in an agrarian society, 
there existed a communal form of responsibility for those 
experiencing mental difficulties. Undoubtedly much of what 
is labeled today as serious mental impairment was normalized 
within these extended kinship networks. With the advent of 
capitalism and the emergence of the nuclear family the re-
sponsibility for the mentally deviant was socialized, iron-
ically enough, to a level of impersonal and systematized 
treatment characterized by extensive stigma to the deviants. 
It is no coincidence that the insane asylum appeared in the 
same era as did workhouses and prisons, as is shown by Roth-
man (1971). In fact, as Rosen (1968:277) indicates, many 
of the mentally disturbed were still located within poor-
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houses, jails, and similar facilities as late as the middle 
of the nineteenth century, attesting to the fact that these 
innovations were different components of a common problem: 
that capitalism effected a massive reordering of social forms 
as well as a serious disruption of the labor market. 
A thorough analysis of documents, records, and personal 
accounts should show that mental deviance was handled almost 
entirely within extended kinship networks in pre-capitalistic 
society. Such sources of data should also reveal a progres-
sive movement to more depersonalized and stigmatizing soci-
etal responses to this phenomenon. 
One could put forward the argument that the alarming 
increases in criminality, juvenile delinquency, poverty, and 
mental disorders that characterized this period are attri-
butable to unemployment, underemployment, and increasing 
demand for superior mental skills and abilities. There was 
a total absence of governmental responses to alleviate these 
difficulties except in the most superficial way. 
COROLLARY IC. That the bias within early capitalism 
toward a "laissez-faire" governmental posture yielded 
a response directed simply toward getting the soci-
ally undesirable people out of the public's view. 
The types of societal responses that were made reveal, 
according to Mauss, that the government was simply doing the 
least that it could to solve these problems. The incipiency 
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of the mental health movement reflected the basic strategy 
of getting deviants "out of sight and out of mind 11 - it did 
not represent a rational response to the latest advances in 
behavioral science. 
While the 18th century brought with it asylums 
in Europe and almshouses in America, these develop-
ments only seemed to represent moves to get the 
mentally disordered "off the streets," rather than 
reflecting significant changes in the attitude to-
ward this form of deviance. These new institutions 
largely served a custodial function, and were char-
acterized by extremely heterogeneous populations of 
unfortunates. (Mauss, 1975:337) 
Not enough attention has been given to the way in which 
social responses to mental disorders have operated to mediate 
the disruptions caused by industrial capitalism.* The :men-
tally disordered are not the only social category that have 
been generated and stigmatized by the changes that have oc-
curred. According to Goffman we can understand the nature 
of the social response to mental disorders by viewing it as 
one among several responses to people who represent problems 
for capitalistic society. 
• • • we must see the mental hospital in the re-
cent historical context in which it developed, as 
one among a network of institutions designed to 
* This point is not directly refuted by virtue of simi-
lar responses to mental disorders in socialist or conununist 
countries. The predominant modes of conceptualization of 
mental disorder were developed within capitalistic social 
structures and contemporary conceptions workdwide (in advanced 
societies) are still heavily burdened with the past, a point 
on which we will further elaborate shortly. There is some 
indication, however, according to Sidel (1975), tha,t re-
sponses to mental disorders in China operate from very dif-
ferent premises than those of American psychiatric practice, 
provide a residence for various categories of so-
cially troublesome people. These institutions in-
clude nursing homes, general hospitals, veteran's 
homes, jails, geriatrics clinics, homes for the 
mentally retarded, work farms, orphanages, and old-
folks' homes. (Goffman, 1973:30) 
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Sociohistorical analysis of the sort implied by this prop-
osition should yield a picture of continuous obfuscation and 
mystification of the issues of insanity as the result of us-
ing an inadequate model (i.e. the medical model) which has 
severely restricted the ability to scientifically investigate 
this area (Mauss, 1975:356). The medical model did provide 
a handy legitimation for the way in which the mentally de-
viant were being handled. Like any other sick person the 
mental deviant was carted off to some appropriate facility 
at which he or she could be adequately "treated." 
Paradoxically the government was being asked to take 
care of society's growing number of deviants while at the 
same time there was a strong predilection to adhere to the 
Spencerian notion that the internal dynamics of capitalism 
would work themselves out. Critical evaluations of the harm-
ful effects of the status quo simply did not exist. The 
emerging system was taken for granted and the growing numbers 
of undesirables simply stored in social warehouses. 
for example. Much more investigation of this matter is needed 
before any conclusions can be drawn. Such investigations of 
these issues in socialist or communist countries should be 
sensitive to the ways in which existing responses to mental 
disorders have emerged historically and how they function at 
present to bolster the existing political arrangements. 
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PROPOSITION II. That traditional psychiatric and psy-
chological practice functions, to a significant degree, 
as a mechanism of social control. 
Given the burgeoning volume of criticism that has been di-
rected toward psychiatric thinking one has to wonder why it 
has been so resistant to change. One possible answer is that 
psychiatric practice has provided a needed mechanism for le-
gitimating oppressive responses to those who manage to voice 
objections, challenges, or queries to the sta.tus quo. The 
dimension of psychiatric practice characterized by social 
control activities does not typically resemble the form of 
conspiring actors toward "politically dangerous" persons. 
Rather it generally appears, at least in a one-dimensional 
society, almost imperceptably as an ideological or ethical 
component which thrusts anyone who questions the "givens" 
of his or her social world into the role of the deviant. The 
fabric of our society is interwoven with a plethora of in-
stitutional, governmental, and bureaucratic edifices that are 
served by this kind of ideological structure. comprehensive 
sociohistorical analysis should uncover a large number of 
parties and interests that have been, and that now are, served 
by traditional thought and response to mental disorders and 
how their power and influence have in turn served to entrench 
traditional thinking. This calls for Marxian extension of 
the analyses offered by Rothman (1971), Mauss (1975:ch9), 
Rosen (1968) and Richard La Piere (1959) in terms of the re-
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lationship between the transformations and interrelatinships 
within capitalistic society and social construction of the 
concept of mental illness and the emergence of mental hos-
pitals and psychiatric treatment. 
The pervasive use of psychiatric or psychological in-
tervention in our lives can be seen as taking up the slack 
that exists as the result of the erosion of important "cool-
ing out" mechanisms such as religious instruction which was 
instrumental in getting people, especially in earlier his-
torical periods, to yield to a variety of oppressive relation-
ships; to accept their "stations in life." When areas in 
which psychiatry and psychology are employed are investigated 
they will reveal this function in many different forms. The 
most overt examples have been identified by Brown (1973:xv). 
Industrial psychologists make factory workers more 
"comfortable," but only in ways to sap their mili-
tancy and thus insure corporate prof it • • • Adver-
tising psychologists aid the corporations on the 
opposite end by brainwashing people into consuming 
harmful and/or meaningless products, with the prom-
ise of financial and/or sexual success if the cor-
rect products are bought. School psychologists 
push working class children into vocational tracts 
••• they counsel students against militancy ••• 
{and] report their "antisocial" attitudes to the 
higher administration. Military psychologists 
polish the machinery of U.S. imperialism ••• pro-
viding "adjustment" for antiwar GI's and counseling 
bomber pilots so they won't feel guilty about na-
palming Vietnamese. Behavior modification experts 
work out tortures to "cure" deviants • • • Social 
psychologists perform research for counterinsurgency 
plans at home and abroad ••• State hospitals jack 
people up on thorazine and give electroshock or lo-
botomies to working class people whose behavior would 
never be "treated" if they were wealthy. 
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The corollaries that follow point out some of the gen-
eral ways in which traditional psychiatric thought enhances 
the status quo. 
COROLLARY !IA. That the inherent focus in psychi-
atric theory and treatment upon the individual has 
blurred vision into the sociological and social psy-
chological dimensions of insanity. 
A thoroughgoing survey of the predominant theories 
and modes of treatment should demonstrate that traditional 
psychiatric thought excludes all but the most individual-
istic factors involved in mental disorders. This observa-
tion may sound overly simplistic but it must be pointed out 
that adherence to models and theories that rule out the pos~ 
sibility of the etiological significance of social factors 
will only generate research and findings that invariably 
support the theory or model. Truly scientific perspectives 
seek to find instances or findings that would qualify the 
theory or model. Self-validating perspectives serve no le-
gitimate scientific purposes although they may often provide 
valuable commodities to some parties. Again, the propaga-
tion of social fictions that are very real in their conse-
quences do not have to be conspiratorial in nature. Psy-
chiatrists are typically exposed to a lengthy experience of 
secondary socialization in which they inculcate the "truths" 
and techniques of their profession. They have a definite 
vested interest in these "truths" in that they help to pre-
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serve the lofty rung in the social ladder upon which the 
psychiatrist stands. Few choose to criticize their own com-
fortable profession (seldom is it the king who both per-
ceives the treachery of his reign and rises up in revolt 
against it). Still some psychiatrists have risen up in re-
bellion and the number of theorists that point to social 
factors is growing, albeit very slowly. The vast majority, 
unfortunately, still respond to their patients as the locus 
of the causal forces relevant to their current distresses. 
COROLLARY IIB. That mental health practitioners 
typically "treat" their patients by prescribing some 
form of adjustment to oppressive living conditions. 
This corollary could be construed to imply the assump-
tion that all mental disorders are characterized by oppres-
sive living conditions. To overcome this difficulty it 
would be necessary to evaluate a sample of patients in terms 
of all potential factors contributing to their present dif-
ficulties that could be defined as oppressive. This evalu-
ation would then be compared to the therapists' evaluations 
to answer two different questions: (1) Did the therapist 
uncover the oppressive characteristics of the patients' en-
vironment if any exist? and, ( 2) ,mid the tiherapis.t, iW:hen aware 
of oppressive conditions, seek to alter those conditions or 
to promote adjustment to unaltered conditions? In other 
words, a therapist may promote adjustment to oppressive con-
85 
ditions unwittingly be adhering to a line of inquiry that 
inherently obviates the discovery of such factors by virtue 
of an exclusive focus on the individual or he may do so by 
directly facilitating adjustment to known conditions of op-
pression, whenever oppressive contingencies are relevant to 
a disorder. 
The potential use of residual categories of psychiatric 
distresses such as schizophrenia or neurosis to mask the ex-
istence of oppressive relationships should not be overlooked. 
A therapist may, for example, decide for a number of possible 
reasons to avoid confronting a pejorative living condition 
by using a vague diagnostic label to conveniently "locate" 
the problem within the patient. For instance, the therapist 
may engender financial reward, prestige, or some other sim-
ilar payoff by overlooking the existence of an oppressive 
relationship. 
COROLLARY IIC. That most psychiatric diagnostic 
categories are social constructions that are devoid 
of a scientifically skeptical dimension and which 
are sufficiently vague so as to be of little use in 
interpreting or treating behavior and which exist, 
therefore, as self-validating constructs. 
We have already referred to the research of Caetano 
(1974), Greenley (1975), Obeysekere (1975), Rosenhan (1975), 
Siamak (1975), and Temerlin (1975) which have some bearing 
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on this issue. These studies are far from exhaustive, how-
ever. We need to know more about specific diagnostic cat-
egories1 where they originated sociohistorically, how they 
are linked to the medical model, and how they are applied 
within actual psychiatric settings. This topic is crucial 
since, according to ethnomethodologists like Blum (1970:38), 
"mental illness is possible because [people], in very small 
and ordinary ways, treat certain behavior as 'mentally ill' 
and collaboratively develop systematic ways of recognizing, 
categorizing, and acting upon such behavior." That is to 
say, that particular patterns of social interaction are in-
strumental in constructing the taken-for-granted reality of 
mental illness. If we pursue Blum's contention we would 
systematically observe the way in which categories or des-
criptions are actually applied to individuals within psy-
chiatric settings. 
COROLLARY !ID. That psychiatric diagnostic categor-
ies are used with regularity to discredit individuals 
making legitimate claims as to the conditions of 
their families, school environments, work, government, 
and other similar entities. 
In much previous discussion the nature of discrediting 
labeling has been explicated. Little research, however, 
exists to substantiate the claims that have been made. Sam-
ples of patients should be evaluated especially in regard to 
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the observations that they relate pertaining to their living 
conditions. Comparisons between the patients' perceptions 
and the actual nature of the living conditions should evi-
dence a significant proportion of the cases in which the 
patient is reasonably depicting the existence of oppressive 
relationships. As the works of Laing, Szasz, and Cooper 
demonstrate, extreme sensitivity to modes of communication 
employed and the problems of translation is essential. In 
cases where the patient is relating oppressive conditions 
of his or her living situations observations should be made 
to determine the degree to which the therapist has under-
stood and responded to the patients' claims. Investigations 
at this point should be especially sensitive to the use of 
diagnostic labels to discredit the patient. Once again, the 
act of discrediting labeling need not be conspiratorial in 
nature, although one should suspect that this is sometimes 
the case. The absence of inquiries into patients' social 
environments or the failure to decipher, or even attempt to 
decipher, their communications grants a large measure of 
credibility to the labels that are affixed to persons who 
in very odd ways attempt to relate their painful experiences. 
The stigma associated with the label still acts to discredit 
the patient and any past or future claims that are made re-
garding his or her social environment. 
This type of research should move on to cross-cultural 
investigations. These probes should show a higher incidence 
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of discrediting labeling within capitalistic societies or 
any other type of society characterized by a predominance 
of sociopsychological manipulation and oppression.. These 
types of sociopsychological manipulations, according to rad-
ical analysis, are woven into the very fabric of capitalist 
societies. 
PROPOSITION III. That oppressive agencies of so-
cialization are instrumental in producing and/or ex-
acerbating many mental disorders. 
Our analysis has recounted the ways in which the vari-
ous agencies of socialization within capitalistic society 
are often engaged in the oppressive transmission of a con-
ception of reality that is presented as inevitable and in-
fallible. The very fact that individuals are socialized to 
accept the social constructions of reality of their families 
and social groups as inevitable can result in serious dis-
• 
tortion of their perceptual abilities. If one should suffer 
from the nature of oppressive living conditions his or her 
ability to identify the source of suffering and successfully 
communicate that observation to others is often severely 
restricted. For the individual suffering from some other 
source of debilitation, such as endocrinic, genetic, or 
neurological defects, this type of socialization experience 
operates to intensify the person's confusion or disorienta-
tion • 
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Extensions of the research that has inspected various 
dimensions of the authoritarian personality should further 
demonstrate the perceptual distortions der:d.ving from author-
itarian socialization practices. 
COROLLARY IIIA. That early oppression in the fam-
ily restricts development of the self (in a Meadian 
sense) and other aspects of genuine autonomy in the 
child. 
The case studies related by Laing and Cooper point out 
the likely relationship between oppressive family structures 
and the incidence of mental distress in those upon whom such 
oppression is focused. Much more investigation of the mes-
sages offered by the mentally disturbed is needed to expli-
cate the relationship between oppressive socialization and 
the development of individual autonomy that is demonstrated 
in intrapersonal communication between the "I" and the "me." 
Complete development of the self allows one to fully dis-
tinquish between acts and attitudes that are initiated by 
one's self and those initiated by others. A youngster that 
has been oppressively trained is severely restricted from 
either initiating genuinely autonomous actions or even per-
ceiving that his or her actions derive from parental train-
ing. 
Also samples of mental patients should be inspected in 
terms of the incidence of relevant oppressive family struc-
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tures. It is possible that different forms of family op-
pression are linked to specific types of mental difficulties. 
Unfortunately, little work has been done in this area. Some 
studies investigating double-bind family structures, however, 
touch on this area, especially in pointing to the effects of 
overly dominant mothers upon children. A more explicit em-
phasis upon the role of oppression in these studies of family 
structures should provide some of the answers to the ques-
tions that have been raised here. 
COROLLARY IIIB. That early experiences of oppres-
sion severely incapacitate a person's ability to 
identify oppressive contingencies and to relate 
those contingencies to others. 
An oppressive parent may refuse to allow a child the 
possibility of referring to him or her with any negative 
symbols. The youngster therefore has access only to posi-
tive symbols when referring to the parent. Thus, it becomes 
impossible to locate the source of one's suffering or pain 
within one's parent. Schatzman points out the way in which 
Schreber's father accomplished this withholding of negative 
symbols for himself from his son. Even many years later 
Schreber was still unable to link negative symbols with his 
father. Research should be directed toward the symbolic 
capabilities of mental patients in reference to parents or 
other significant persons. 
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The possibility also exists that a range of emotions 
that for most people have been ascribed comfortable symbolic 
status have been denied symbolic referents for those suffer-
ing from mental distress. The observations made by Szasz 
certainly point to the very real difficulties that sufferers 
of mental distress have in communicating their feelings. 
Obviously, much more research into these areas is needed. 
COROLLARY IIIC. That oppressive responses by mental 
health professionals further mystify the relation-
ships within which those suffering from sociopsy-
chological distress find themselves. 
If, as we have contended, the mentally distressed in-
dividual eXPeriences severe perceptual and communicational 
distortion and confusion then further oppressive responses 
from therapists will only intensify the problem. Thrusting 
the mental patient into a situation in which he or she is 
given a variety of alleged internal constructs (e.g. anal 
fixation, latent homosexual love, Oedipal conflicts, etc.} 
merely serves to compound the confusion that is experienced. 
Attention is shifted away from external empirical factors 
to internal abstractions. The patient is forced to think 
and communicate in this mode by virtue of the fact that this 
is the mode established by the therapist who, by definition, 
stands in a superordinate position to the patient within the 
therapeutic setting. The patient may also feel compelled to 
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communicate within the confines of this mode for fear of 
losing what may be his or her only source of attention and 
response to the experienced problems. For the patient this 
presents a dual problem: Cl) the objective living condi-
tions that are instrumental in the present difficulty are 
not being dealt with; and, (2) the patient has now been la-
beled and stigmatized in such a manner that complaints or 
rejection of the dominant therapeutic mode would simply lend 
credence to the label that has been used. A systematic in-
vestigation of the therapeutic milieu through a series of 
participant observational studies should help to illuminate 
these processes. 
PROPOSITION IV. That, when the individual challenges 
accepted socially constructed reality, a number of 
intrapersonal processes are set in motion which 
generate, to varying degrees, a variety of socio-
psychological distresses. 
The preceding propositions and corollaries address 
the way in which agencies of socialization and social control 
interact to entrench conventional conceptions of reality in 
the minds of individuals. When, for whatever reason, one 
challenges these conventional conceptions a number of inter-
nal and external events occur which, at best, will yield 
some rather unpleasant and stressful experiences and which, 
at worst, will lead to complete loss of contact with one's 
fellows and the reality shared therewith. 
COROLLARY IVA. That one consequence of challenging 
generally accepted notions of social reality is the 
emergence of experiences of confusion, doubt, or 
guilt that, if severe enough, will eventuate in ser-
ious mental impairment. 
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In the process of terminating one's allegiance to a 
reality that has been internalized over a lengthy period of 
time one may be left in a state of limbo or seclusion from 
a solid social base of reality. The bonafide revolutionary 
will be among those that will undoubtedly suffer the least 
in such situations in that he or she is typically shedding 
one socially based perception of reality for one that is 
unconventional, radical, or unpopular but which still has 
some social foundation. The extreme comradery that often 
characterizes revolutionary groups undoubtedly reflects the 
need for a socially shareable alternative reality for such 
people. The atheist in a predominantly religious culture 
may have more difficulty in finding a shareable conceptual 
alternative. In both cases there is the liklihood that 
numerous experiences of confusion, doubt, and guilt will 
creep into the consciousness of the challengers. The young-
ster rejecting the reality imposed by the family will ex-
perience even more difficulty. Who is there to share his or 
her deviant perception of the family situation? This person 
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may very well be locked into intrapersonal communication re-
garding the family yielding increasing reliance upon idio-
syncratic symbols which intensify the communicational prob-
lems as they spill over into interpersonal interaction, in 
which contexts they stimulate negative social reactions. 
These aversive social experiences will in turn engender 
greater reliance upon idiosyncratic intrapersonal communica-
tion. The point may come, as is suggested in the observa-
tions made by Laing, Cooper, Schatzman, and others, where 
the distressed individual may no longer be able to distin-
guish between the self and others or between intrapersonal 
and interpersonal communication. 
COROLLARY IVB. That a second consequence of chal-
lenging conventional conceptions of reality is an 
ensuing process of social reactions that tend to in-
tensify the feelings of confusion, doubt, and guilt. 
The typical response to unconventional or deviant con-
ceptions of reality is one of intolerance, ridicule, and 
castigation. Ranging from a raised eyebrow to some type of 
physical punishment, these responses tend to elicit feelings 
of hesitancy and anxiety. If one persists, a process of sys-
tematic exclusion from further interaction may follow which 
contributes to the shrinkage of one's social base for shar-
ing reality. As Lemert has so perceptively observed, the 
"dynamics of exclusion" serve to amplify the problems ex-
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perienced by the deviant and so grant credence to the con-
tention that he or she is increasingly "psychotic" or "emo-
tionally disturbed." 
The psychiatric labels that are often applied may 
evoke such morbid fear in the mind of the labeled person 
that he or she is disoriented to the point of fulfilling the 
most extreme symptoms that are implied by the particular 
label. The child that goes against strong parental direc-
tives can also experience the debilitating effects of intense 
fear. For example, the youngster who masturbates after being 
continually warned that it will cause "madness" may exper-
ience a degree of anxiety sufficient to precipitate behavior 
that is supposedly symptomatic of that "madness." 
It is easy to overstate the case embodied in the last 
two corollaries; but this shouldn't effect a barrier to the 
kind of investigations that would shed light on these issues. 
Admittedly, developing appropriate methods of inquiry into 
these questions would be difficult. One could, however, ob-
serve and interview subjects displaying various types and 
degrees of deviant conceptual constructs in a number of 
natural and experimental settings to determine some of the 
intra- and interpersonal processes involved. 
The foregoing set of propositions and corollaries are 
offered as a beginning point for research that would move 
from a radical sociology of knowledge perspective on the 
issue of insanity. To this point investigation into these 
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areas has been minimal and much of the argument is more rhe-
torical than demonstrably empirical. Often the findings that 
do exist are the result of dubious techniques such as case 
studies. What is needed is a rigorous and comprehensive re-
search effort begining with these propositions or similarly 
constructed statements that clarify this position both in 




In our sociological excursus into the ambiguous world 
of insanity we have witnessed how that psychiatry and the 
concept of "mental illness" have evolved as a historical re-
sponse of society to an enduring social problem. The soci-
ology of knowledge, when modified to incorporate the dis-
tribution of power in social relationships, proves to be an 
effective analytic tool by which to chip away the heavy 
scales of mystification and reification that have enshrouded 
both the past and contemporaneous role of knowledge and con-
sciousness in the societal response to insanity. A radical 
sociology of knowledge provides the necessary link between 
phenomenological and dialectical approaches that enables us 
to more completely conceptualize the social construction of 
reality in history. The treatment of this point in this 
paper has largely been suggestive; this formulation is sub-
ject to considerable refinement and clarification. 
In terms of the "antipsychiatry" literature this frame.:. 
work provides the crucial focus upon the relationship between 
individual crises in knowledge and the nature of knowledge 
in its everyday life contexts inasmuch as it is sensitive 
to the dialectical and phenomenological relationship between 
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individual and society. Our analysis has suggested the ad-
vantages of a radical sociology of knowledge over a radical 
psychology as an interpretive framework for the general cri-
tique of the mental health establishment found in the "anti-
psychiatry" literature. A radical psychology will do justice 
to only half of the dialectical relationship between man and 
society. This is not to invalidate some of the intermediary 
findings that such a perspective may reveal. Certainly the 
role of biopsychological factors in various aspects of de-
fective socialization needs much further clarification; but 
the "antipsychiatry movement" calls for a much more compre-
hensive analysis of these issues. The very sociohistorical 
context of the "movement" is rooted in a general critique of 
captialism that gained momentum in the 1960's. This factor 
linked with the disappointing failures of traditional psy-
chiatric and psychological approaches regarding insanity has 
continually pointed toward the role of external factors. 
This is a call for the holistic analysis of a radical soci-
ology of knowledge which, unlike traditional psychological 
and sociological perspectives, treats both social structure 
and individual consciousness as parts of the same process. 
An added advantage of this framework is its inherent rela-
tivistic nature which should make it less susceptable to the 
crystallization or reification that had been so pervasive in 
analyses of the phenomenon of insanity. 
Another advantage is the fact that a radical sociology 
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of knowledge carries with it a sociopsychological perspective 
(i.e. Meadian social psychology) that has become increasingly 
acceptable to Marxists. This nascent perspective refuses to 
conceive of the individual qua individual; rather it promotes 
an image of man as a social being whose consciousness is a 
social product. The suggestions regarding the incorporation 
of the Meadian perspective into radical analysis needs to be 
inspected in much greater detail than we have been able to 
do here. 
We have also suggested what is felt to be a coherent 
method of incorporating the labeling perspective within radi-
cal sociological theory. This involves conceptualizing the 
process of labeling as an aspect of social control based 
upon the discrediting of deviants and their insights, obser-
vations, and complaints, in efforts to buttress the status 
quo. Addition of the factors of differential power distri-
bution to traditional labeling arguments has enabled us to 
discuss everyday life in terms of its political dimensions 
sensitizing us to the existence of the oppressive use of 
labeling at this level of social life. We have been able to 
discuss this oppression as the indirect effect of the class 
struggle in Western society, thus avoiding the pitfalls of 
mechanistic Marxism. The point to be stressed is that those 
possessing positions of relative power tend to utilize that 
power to reify the status quo in their own interests. 
Our investigation has revealed a paucity of research 
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into many important issues of insanity. Much of the research 
that has been carried out moves from self-validating premises 
of traditional psychiatric approaches. In response we have 
developed a set of propositions that, if tested, would lay 
the empirical groundwork for a radical investigation of 
"mental illness." The propositional model is a mere skeletal 
configuration of what wholesale investigation of these issues 
would involve. Thus, there are many questions that have 
gone unaddressed in this inquiry. 
For example, we have dealt with some specific "mental 
disorders" and suggested some ways to analyze the role of 
oppression in their etiology and remediation. This area 
needs much more exploration and clarification. We failed 
to deal with such psychiatric categories as neurosis, alco-
holism, or manic-depressive psychosis. If, as we have sug-
gested, the oppressed are calling for help via a "mental dis-
order" why is it that a specific disorder is chosen over 
others? The psychiatric categories of schizophrenia, par-
anoia, and hysteria continually emerge in the "antipsychiatry" 
literature. Is it possible that these are the only categories 
in which oppression is implicated as a causal force? What 
is the role of oppression upon different processes of social-
ization that might lead to particular types of behavioral re-
sponses? These are some of the questions that arise from 
our investigation that when addressed should further clarify 
the role of oppression in the etiology of insanity. 
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In terms of treatment, a radical sociology of knowledge 
implies a dual strategy of working with individuals to im-
part to them an understanding of the inherent problems of 
socially constructed reality and to help them modify the 
oppressive contingencies within their own environments. This 
approach suggests that "crazy" communications be inspected 
in terms of complaint and suffering rather than disorder and 
illness. A question for the future is an unenviable analysis 
of the family; its oppressive characteristics and the various 
alternatives to it. The sticky issue of intervention into 
families and the legal rights of parents will become para-
mount in this discussion. 
It is certain that the effects of isolation and de-
humanization characteristic of mental hospitals and psychia-
tric treatment are decidedly pejorative according to this 
framework; social reality is best maintained through language, 
conversation, and interaction; not warehousing. 
Though the questions that have been raised by this in-
vestigation far outweigh the answers one has to feel confi-
dent that at least some of the dimensions of insanity can 
be fruitfully conceptualized within a radical sociology of 
knowledge. It certainly represents a marked improvement 
over traditional responses to insanity and yields a coherent 
mode for conceptualization of the "antipsychiatry" insights. 
We should repeat the observation that a radical anal-
ysis of insanity within Western society such as that offered 
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in this paper should in no way be construed to mean that in-
sanity is caused by capitalism per se. Obviously insanity 
exists in all known types of society, both primitive and so-
cialist. Cross-societal research into insanity investiga-
ting the role of oppression should help us to further under-
stand the operation of knowledge as it is dialectically con-
structed and as it relates to the problems of consciousness 
suggested by Marx and others. 
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